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11 JUN 2001

Intellectual and Moral elements contrasted.

The *intellectual and moral* elements are quite distinct from each other. The intellect may be vigorous while the moral condition is depressed; and the moral powers may be highly developed without a corresponding mental culture.

The two should harmonise.

In a well-regulated mind there is an intimate harmony between these two elements. Knowledge, however attained, ought ever to contribute to man's moral well-being.

Harmony seldom found.

Such a regulated mental constitution does not, however, exist generally. The mind in this world is kept so much under the influence of external things, that sufficient time is rarely allowed for retirement and calm reflection.

Conscience a special source of information in Morality.

The *science* that deals with moral phenomena is both important and difficult, so difficult that little progress could be effected without some special aid. This aid is furnished by *conscience*. Thus in moral enquires we are guided not only by ordinary scientific principles, but also by the dictates of conscience.

PREFACE.

THE objects for which this little work has been compiled are the same as those already indicated in the Preface to the Analysis of the Intellectual Powers. The two Analyses together form a complete synopsis of Abercrombie's treatise, and contain all the matter which the author considers at present necessary for second-year students of the Calcutta University.

It will be observed that in the Chapter on the Theories of Morals, quotations have been given from most of the ethical writers whose systems have been considered. These quotations may, perhaps, appear out of place in a mere Analysis ; but as Abercrombie's descriptions are generally very brief, it seemed that this part of the work might be amplified with some advantage. The passages selected, it is hoped, will convey a *correct*, though of course most inadequate, view of the doctrines to which they refer ; and will prove interesting to the reader as containing the *ipsissima verba* of some of the greatest masters of ethical science.

To render this book more useful than it would be as mere abstract, a collection of Notes and Dissertations has been added. The Notes in Appendix I. are intended to illustrate the text : the Dissertations in Appendix II.* have reference to matters not touched upon in the Analysis

* It was not till after sending the Analysis and Notes to the press that the author began to review the materials collected for forming this Appendix. After careful consideration, it appeared that the Dissertations were too long and too numerous to admit of their forming an *Appendix* to the Analysis. The original plan, therefore, has not been fully carried out ; and Appendix II., as it now appears, contains only such matter as may be useful to second-year students. The Dissertations which were to have completed the second Appendix, will be published separately.

Passion or *appetite* simply urges us to a certain object, without regarding the character of the means employed. *Reflection* or *conscience* comes in and disapproves. Which is to be obeyed? Surely the latter. The principle of conscience or reflection being compared with the various appetites, passions, and affections, the former is manifestly superior, without regard to strength. The passions and appetites have *power*, but conscience has *authority*. No notion can be formed of conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendence. This is a constituent part of the idea, and, therefore, of the faculty itself: to preside and govern, from the very constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength, as it had right: had it power, as it had manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world.

[BUTLER, Rev. Joseph, D. D., a learned English Bishop. He was the author of the celebrated 'Analogy of Religion.' His ethical speculations are contained in his sermons entitled 'Upon Human Nature.'—(b. 1692—d. 1752).]

3. PLATO'S VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE.

Plato divided the soul into three different natures:

1st.—*Reason*, or the governing power.

2nd.—The *irascible* element, including the passions founded on pride and resentment.

3rd.—The *appetites*, or passions which have pleasure for their object.

Virtue exhibited itself only when each of these three faculties confined itself to its proper office, without attempting to encroach upon that of any other, when reason *directed*, and passion obeyed; and when each passion performed its proper duty easily, and without reluctance.

[PLATO, (B. C. 429—347), was a native of Athens, a disciple of Socrates, and founder of the Academic School. He developed the celebrated doctrine of Ideas. According to this doctrine, all the objects which surround us in this world

itself. It is intended that the Analysis and Appendices together should form a complete compendium of the subject treated of.

Questions have been added which will enable the learner to test his knowledge by occasional self-examination.

In the Preface to the Analysis of the Intellectual Powers, it was stated that Psychology was not considered by the author a subject adapted for the First Examination in Arts. The same objections which apply to Psychology do not apply so strongly to Ethics, but there are other objections which may be urged against the latter subject, quite as serious, it appears to me, as those which may be urged against the former. All our teaching up to the B. A. Examination should be as definite as possible. The undeveloped mind requires certainty, not doubt; any subject, therefore, which still affords a battle-ground for conflicting opinions, had better be dismissed till the judgment is ripe, and the imagination controlled by the intellect.

I should certainly place Ethics in the category of subjects to be avoided by the mere tyro. A sufficient agreement does not as yet obtain among the greatest thinkers to warrant us in regarding Ethics as a definitely constituted science for dogmatic purposes. The two great and hostile schools of thought, which have so long contended for the victory, still flourish, and still claim our impartial consideration, though one only* may secure our undivided

* For my own part, I adhere to a system which, as interpreted by most of its supporters, dooms both these schools to a speedy extinction, and regards them even now as chiefly valuable in order to illustrate the history of the human mind. The system I allude to is that of Comte. If Comte's classification is correct, mental science must eventually be incorporated with Biology; while moral science, dealing as it does with the most special phenomena, namely, those of the individual man, must form the complement of Sociology, which deals with man in the aggregate. The ethical systems, both of ancient and modern times, from Socrates to Bentham, all belong to what Comte would term the metaphysical stage of moral science.

According to these definitions, an action may be right, in one sense, and wrong in another.

It is the relative rectitude of an action which determines the moral desert of the agent ; but it is its absolute rectitude which determines its utility to his worldly interests, and to the welfare of society. And it is only so far as relative and absolute rectitude coincide, that utility can be affirmed to be a quality of Virtue.

A strong sense of Duty will, indeed, induce us to avail ourselves of all the talents we possess, and of all the information within our reach, to act agreeably to the rules of absolute rectitude. And, if we fail in doing so, our negligence is criminal. But still, in every particular instance, our duty consists in doing what appears to us to be right at the time ; and if, while we follow this rule, we should incur any blame, our demerit does not arise from acting according to an erroneous judgment, but from our previous misemployment of the means we possessed, for correcting the errors to which our judgment is liable.—(Stewart.)

[STEWART, DUGALD, (b. 1753, in Edinburgh—d. 1828). He was a disciple of Reid, and was, for many years, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh.

The following is an outline of his ethical system :

The Active Principles of man are : 1, Appetites ; 2, Desires ; 3, Affections ; 4, Self-love ; 5, The Moral Faculty.

The three first are 'Instinctive or Implanted Propensities' ; the two last 'Rational and Governing Principles of Action.'

The *elementary desires* are as follows : The desire (i.) of Knowledge ; (ii.) of Society ; (iii.) of Esteem ; (iv.) of Power ; (v.) of Superiority.

The *affections* are sub-divided into Benevolent and Malevolent. The *Benevolent* are the Parental and Filial affections, the affections of Kindred, Love, Friendship, Patriotism, Universal Benevolence, Gratitude, Pity to the distressed. The *Malevolent* are Hatred, Jealousy, Envy, Revenge, Misanthropy ; all which may be grafted on the single principle — Resentment.

The *instinctive propensities* are under the control of the *two rational and governing principles*, self-love and the moral

ed allegiance. Now if the student is to acquire any knowledge worth having, it is essential that he should not confine his attention to one only of the great Ethical systems : materials should be supplied which may enable him to form a correct estimate of both, and in arriving at his conclusions he should carefully consider *all* the arguments, whether favorable or adverse, which may be brought to bear upon them. The result, however, of such a course as that here indicated, would be to produce a most undesirable perplexity and confusion in minds which had not previously undergone a systematic and special discipline. To avoid this perplexity, the subject has to be treated in the most partial manner ; and the effect of our one-sided teaching is, either to induce the student to believe that certainty and unanimity prevail in a region where doubt and discord have not ceased to reign ; or to make him an obstinate convert to utilitarianism when he becomes acquainted with it, sometimes from a mere love of novelty, but oftener from that feeling of rebellion against conventional dogmas which is peculiar to many minds, and which operates with more than ordinary force upon the young.

It seems to me, therefore, that an elementary course of Logic would be preferable to the present course of Mental and Moral Science, at the First Examination in Arts. The elements of Formal Logic would not only be thoroughly intelligible to the student at this stage of his progress, but would also be of great assistance to him in the study of Geometry. The mental and moral sciences, if considered an indispensable part of the University training, had better be confined to the B. A. course, into which they already enter : the effect of introducing them at an earlier period cannot be otherwise than injurious.

In the Notes and Dissertations appended to the Analysis, my simple object has been to give the opinions of the best ethical writers, as far as my reading would allow.

No attempt has been made at originality: clear arrangement, and a supply of material adapted, both in quantity and kind, for the purposes of the learner, are the only ends which have been kept in view.

My best thanks are due to Mr. Croft, Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy and Logic, in the Presidency College, for the valuable assistance he has rendered me in preparing this work for the press.

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7 Reid (1710—1795) was the first to adopt this principle of classification. For Reid's analysis, *vide* p. 81: for Stewart's, *vide* p. 105.

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ERRATA.

Page 5, line 6, for "Nor can they, &c." read "(ii.) Nor can they, &c."

Page 24, line 15, for "3. Keeping promises," read "8. Keeping promises."

Page 56, line 10. The quotation from Hobbes should read as follows:

"Whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it, which he for his part calleth *good*; and the object of his hate and aversion, *evil*; and of his contempt, *vile* and *inconsiderable*. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man, where there is no commonwealth; or, in a commonwealth, from the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof."

feel these moral relations, and which guide him in his moral discipline.

ANALYSIS

OF

ABERCROMBIE ON THE MORAL FEELINGS.

INTRODUCTION.

SECTION I.—NATURE OF THE SCIENCE OF THE MORAL FEELINGS.

MAN is to be regarded as an *intellectual*, and Man regarded, as a *moral* being.

By his *intellectual* powers, he acquires the (1) *Intellectually* knowledge of facts, observes their connexions, and traces the conclusions which arise out of them.

But when we contemplate man as a *moral* being, (2) *Morally*. new relations occur :

(a.) We find him placed under a great *system of moral government*. (b.) We also find him placed in certain *relations to the moral Governor of the universe*; and (c.) to a *future state of being* to which this world is preparatory.

Man is possessed of powers which enable him to feel these moral relations, and which guide him in his moral discipline.

SECTION 2.—FIRST TRUTHS IN MORALITY.

The Creator having implanted in the mind of man certain *intellectual* principles, independent of any acquired knowledge, we may expect to find him also endowed with certain fundamental *moral* *a priori*. principles. It is not likely that in the highest concerns of life he would be left to knowledge acquired casually by his own reasoning, or from the teaching of other men.

On examination it will be seen that this presumption is completely justified; certain primary impressions which relate to our moral constitution are found to be developed in a remarkable manner.

Like our intellectual intuitions, they admit of no proof by reasoning; when arguments are brought against them, the appeal must be to the convictions of every well-regulated mind.

The following are the *fundamental moral principles* which arise in the mind by the *most simple process of reflection*: (a.) either as constituting its own primary moral convictions; (b.) or as following from its consciousness of these convictions by an obvious chain of relations.*

I.—(a.) A perception of the nature and quality of actions as *just or unjust, right or wrong*; and (b.) a conviction of certain duties, as of *justice, veracity, and benevolence*, which every man owes to his fellow men. This conviction, (*viz.*, b.) is accompanied by a *feeling of reciprocity*; every man

* The truths included under (I.) are *primary moral convictions*; those included under (II.) follow from (I.); those under (III.), from (I.) and (II.) combined; those under (IV.), from (I.), (II.), and (III.) combined.

expects others to act towards him, as he feels he ought to act towards them.

(II.) Belief in moral Governor. ✓ II.—From our primary moral impressions (*viz.*, those in I.) there arises a conviction of the existence of a great moral Governor of the universe.

(III.) Conviction of moral responsibility. ✓ III.—From these combined impressions (*viz.*, those in I. and II.) there springs the *sense of moral responsibility*, or a conviction that for the due performance of the duties which are indicated by our moral consciousness, we are responsible to God; and that we owe to him a special moral allegiance.

(IV.) Impression of Future Existence. ✓ IV.—From this chain of moral convictions we cannot separate a deep impression of *Future Existence*, and of that as a state of moral retribution.

Proof of First Truths.

Their proof. For the truth of these primary articles of moral belief, we appeal not to any process of reasoning, but to the *convictions of every well-regulated mind*.

We do not go abroad among savage nations to enquire whether the impression of them be universal: for this impression, we are willing to allow, may be obscured in communities, as it is in individuals, by a course of moral degradation.

They originate spontaneously. It is of great *practical* importance, that these first truths should be regarded as originating *spontaneously*; for thus only can they influence men generally.

Only two other sources. If they do not thus originate, they must be derived from one of the two following sources, *viz.*, (i.) a *direct revelation*, or (ii.) a *logical process*.

(i.) They cannot be due to a *direct revelation*, They are because (1st) the belief in them is found where ^{not due} to (i.) no revelation is known; and (2nd) in revelation itself, we find these convictions appealed to as already existing in man.

Nor can they be due to any *logical process*. Nor are Principles which are to regulate conduct must ^{they due} to (ii.) be speedily arrived at, and must be the same for all men. These conditions could not be fulfilled if such practical rules depended upon logical processes.

Some of these principles, such as the *existence of* (II.) and *the Deity* (vide II.), and the *reality of a future life* (IV.) (vide IV.) have been supported by certain *à priori* ^{proved a} *priori*. arguments.*

But such arguments are of no great value: to Such most minds they fail to appear demonstrative, and ^{proofs of} _{no value.} to many they are utterly incomprehensible.

The evidence for such principles must be sought Evidence, for *within*: it is *conscience* which proclaims their ^{internal.} validity.

Importance of First Truths.

It is most important for the well-being of society that there should be certain fixed and generally recognised *principles of relative duty*. Without such principles the whole scheme of things would lapse into confusion. Human laws may restrain or punish gross acts of violence and injustice, but there are numberless injuries and wrongs for which

* *Vide Note A, Appendix I.*

they never can provide. There are, in fact, but few cases which can be provided for by legislation: it is a *principle within* that regulates the whole moral economy.

We believe that the primary moral principles exist in others. Each man not only has a consciousness of possessing within himself certain primary moral principles, but also has a conviction that similar principles exist in others. Hence arises the impression, that, as he judges of their conduct by his own moral feelings, so they will judge of him by corresponding feelings in themselves.

Effects of this belief. Hence springs (a.) that *reciprocity of moral impression*, by which a man feels the opinion of his fellow men to be either a reward or a punishment: also (b.) that great *rule of relative duty*, "Do to others as you would that they should do to you." (c.) This belief also acts as a *check on those who have subdued their own moral feelings*. A man who has thrown off all sense of justice, compassion or benevolence, is still controlled by the conviction that these impressions exist in others.

A GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE MORAL FEELINGS.

Analysis of Man as a Moral Being.

Actions are the external phenomena by which we judge of internal principles. Actions and Motives.

The same action, however, performed by different individuals, may proceed from different *motives* in each case.

When we have the means of determining motives, we estimate a man's moral condition by them, and not by his actions alone. Morality estimated by motive.

In an enquiry regarding the moral constitution of man, the following *elements* must be taken into elements.

a. His *conduct*, or actions.

a. Action.

b. *Will* or simple volition, which is the immediate principle that determines conduct. A man *wills* some act, and the act follows of course, unless it be prevented by restraint from without, or by physical inability to perform it.

c. *Desires, Affections*; and *Self-love.*

c. Moving powers.

The objects of will are referable to two classes: (i.) *objects* to be obtained, and (ii.) *actions* to be performed to others: and these are connected with

viz. two distinct mental conditions, which exist previously to the act of volition:

(i.) Desires. (i.) In regard to objects to be obtained, this mental condition is *Desire*.
 and
 (ii.) Affections. (ii.) In regard to actions towards others, it is *Affection*.

The *desires and affections*, therefore, precede volition. From a desire or an affection, originates the mental state which, under certain conditions, leads to our willing a certain act.

The *act* which is the result of volition, consists either (1) in certain efforts towards attaining the object desired; or (2) in certain conduct towards other men, arising out of our affections or mental feelings towards them.

The *desires and affections*, therefore, may be considered as the *primary or moving powers* from which our actions proceed.

Self-love. There is an important principle connected with the desires and affections which has an extensive influence on our conduct. This is *Self-love*, which leads us to seek our own advantage. It is a legitimate principle of action when kept in its proper place; when allowed to usurp an undue influence, it degenerates into *Selfishness*.

d. Ulterior principles which decide our determinations (vide 1, 2.) *d.* Every desire is not followed by actual volition; and every affection does not lead to the conduct which might flow from it. Thus (i.) a man may *feel a desire* which, after consideration, he determines not to gratify; (ii.) another may *experience an affection* and not act upon it: he may,

for example, feel the impulse of anger, and yet conduct himself with forbearance.

When, therefore, we go back another step, we find *certain principles by which the determination is actually decided.* These principles may be referred to *two heads:*

1. The determination may arise from one of the *moving powers*; this will happen when some one of these powers has acquired a preponderance over the others. This usually results from *Habit* or frequent indulgence. Thus *love of ease* may prevent a man from pursuing some object which he covets, because its attainment would involve strenuous exertion.

2. The determination may arise from a *sense of duty*, or an impression of moral rectitude apart from every personal consideration. This is the moral principle or conscience: it *ought* to be the supreme and regulating principle.

e. The *emotions which arise out of man's relation to the Deity.* e. Religious emotions.

The preceding analysis indicates the following Active division of the subject: principles;

I.—The Desires, the Affections; and Self-love. (1.) Enumerated.

II.—The Will.

III.—The Moral Principle or Conscience.

IV.—The Moral Relation subsisting between man and the Deity.

These constitute the *active principles of man.*

(2.) *Defin-ed.* By *active principles* we mean those which decide man's conduct as a moral and responsible being.

Passive emotions. Besides these, there is another class of feelings, which may be called *passive* or *connecting* emotions. They exert a considerable influence of a *secondary* kind, both on (1) the Desires and (2) the Affections. Such emotions are *Hope, Despair; Pleasure, Regret; Joy, Sorrow; &c.*

As influencing (1°) *Desire* (1.) In general we feel desire when an object presents qualities on account of which we wish to obtain it.

Hope. If we have reason to think the object within our reach, we experience *hope*; and the effect of this is to encourage us in our exertions.

Despair. If we see no prospect of attaining it, we give way to *despair*, and this leads us to abandon all exertion.

Pleasure, Regret. When we attain the object, we experience *pleasure*; if we fail to attain it, we feel *regret*.

Fear. If some evil threatens us, we experience *fear*, and are thereby roused to exertions for averting the evil.

Joy, Sorrow. If we succeed in averting the evil, we experience *joy*; if we do not succeed, *sorrow*.

(2°) *Affec-tions.* (2.) Similar emotions attend *on the affections*.

Hope, Despair. When we see there is a probability that we may exercise an affection, we *hope*; if the contrary, we *despair*.

Self-ap-probation, Remorse. When we have acted on a benevolent affection, or according to the dictates of conscience, we

experience *self-approbation*; when the contrary, we feel *remorse*.

Passion is not a special emotion. Whenever a *Passion*, desire or an affection has acquired an undue influence, so as to disturb the mind, and hurry us to action by a forcible impulse, it becomes a *passion*. In popular language *passion* is used as synonymous with *resentment*: probably because this affection disturbs the reason more, and leaves us less the power of self-government, than any other active principle of our nature.*

* Stewart's Moral Philosophy.

PART. I.

THE DESIRES, THE AFFECTIONS; AND SELF-LOVE.

SECTION 1.—THE DESIRES.

Desire defined. *Desire* is the immediate movement of the mind towards an object which presents some quality on account of which it is sought for.

I. Appetites. The following are the *most elementary* desires : *I.—The Appetites.** These consist in the gratification of our animal propensities.

They are three in number ; hunger, thirst, and the appetite of sex. These we possess in common with the lower animals. The first two are for the preservation of the individual ; the third for the continuance of the species.

They require to be kept under rigid control, and should be always subordinated to the moral principle.

II.—The desire of *wealth*.

This originates in the desire to possess the means of procuring other gratifications. But by the influence of habit, the desire is transferred to the thing itself.†

This propensity, when morbid, is termed *avarice*.

III.—The desire of *power*. This is the love of ruling ; when it becomes the governing propen-

* The Appetites should be distinguished from the other Desires, (*vide Note B, Appendix I.*)

† Such a Desire is termed a *secondary* Desire, (*vide Note C, Appendix I.*)

sity, the strongest principles of human nature give way before it.

This desire is strongly developed in the conqueror, and the statesman. It also influences the philosopher, the poet, the orator, and the advocate.

This desire is sometimes termed *ambition*.

IV.—The desire of *superiority*. This is also termed *emulation*. It is allied to the desire of power, but differs from it by *not including any direct wish to rule*: it aims simply at the acquirement of pre-eminence. It appears in the scholar, the man of the world, the sportsman, and the philanthropist.

When emulation is accompanied with a malevolent feeling, it assumes the name of *envy*.* To desire the attainment of superiority by bringing down others *below our own level*, is the distinguishing characteristic of envy.

V.—The desire of *society*. This desire shows itself at all periods of life, and in all conditions of civilization. It is manifested in the union of the family, in the ties of friendship, and in the formation of civil societies.

How powerfully it operates appears from the effects of solitude upon the mind. Men when left alone make companions of the lower animals, or attach themselves to inanimate objects, and thus strive to fill up the void of which they are conscious.†

VI.—The desire of *esteem*. Though inferior to the sense of moral obligation, this may be consi-

IV. Desire of superiority.

* (*Vide Note D, Appendix I.*)

† Stewart's Moral Philosophy.

dered a laudable principle, as when a man seeks the approbation of others by deeds of benevolence, or patriotism.

A man should seek the approbation of the good, and not of the vicious. The character of the man will correspond to the character of those whose praise he seeks.

Vanity.

In some cases the prevailing principle is an indiscriminate love of approbation, without regard either to the character of the encomiast, or the qualities on which applause is bestowed. This is *Vanity*. It produces wavering and inconsistent conduct, It often leads a man to aim at admiration for distinctions of a trivial character, or even for qualities which he does not really possess.

Pride.

Pride is, to some extent, opposed to *Vanity*. The *proud* man entertains a high opinion of himself, while he is indifferent to the opinion of others.

VII. De-
sire of
knowl-
edge.

VII.—The desire of *knowledge*. This includes the principle of *curiosity*. The tendency of this principle depends, as in the former cases, on its regulation and the objects to which it is directed.

VIII. De-
sire of
moral im-
provement.

VIII.—The desire of *moral improvement*. This leads to the highest state of man ; it is adapted for every class of society, and its object is attainable by all. The mental condition which corresponds to it, consists in the *habitual recognition of the supreme authority of conscience*, and in a constant effort to have every desire and every affection regulated by the moral principle.

IX. De-
sire of
action.

IX.—Desire of *action*. This desire springs from the restless activity of mind, which leads it to re-

quire some object on which its powers must be exercised, and without which it preys upon itself and becomes miserable.

*General remarks.**

Character depends, in a great measure, on *Desire*. General remarks on the Desires. For a *sound moral condition*, the desires must be directed to worthy objects, and their strength must be proportioned to the actual and the relative value of each of these objects.

If the desires are allowed to break from the restraints of reason and conscience, the worst results will inevitably ensue.

The desires may exist in an ill-regulated state, while the conduct is restrained by various principles, such as submission to law, a regard to character, or even a certain feeling of what is right contending with the perverted principle within. But this cannot be considered as a sound moral state.

* (*Vide Note E, Appendix I.*)

SECTION 2.—THE AFFECTIONS.

Desires
and Affec-
tions dis-
tinguish-
ed.

Affections
charac-
terised.

Affection:
defined.

Classified.
Benevolent
and *Male-
volent*, ob-
jection-
able.

Uniting
and *De-
fensive*,
better.

The *Desires* are calculated to bring some gratification to ourselves; the *Affections* lead us to our relations to other men, and to a certain line of conduct which arises out of these relations.

The affections are to be viewed as *original principles of our nature*, the operation of which is *distinct* both from that of the *moral principle and from that of reason*. Thus when the mother tends her infant regardless of her own comfort, she acts from an authoritative impulse within, and is influenced by no other motive.

An *affection*, therefore, may be considered as an *original emotion existing in ourselves, which leads us to a particular conduct towards other men, without reference to any principle except the intuitive impulse of the emotion itself*.

The affections have been divided into the *Benevolent* and *Malevolent*.* Such a division is somewhat objectionable, inasmuch as the latter class of affections should only be termed malevolent, when they are allowed to exceed certain bounds. When acting normally, they merely guard us against the aggressions of other men.

It will be better to divide them into (i.) *Uniting* and (ii.) *Defensive* affections.

(i.) The *Uniting* affections include: 1, Justice; 2, Benevolence; 3, Veracity; 4, Friendship, Love, and Gratitude; 5, Patriotism; and 6, the Domestic Affections.

(ii.) The *Defensive* are: 1, Jealousy; 2, Anger; 3, Resentment.

* This is the division of Reid and Stewart.

I.—JUSTICE.

Strictly speaking, Justice should be regarded as Justice a combined operation of an *affection and the moral principle*. But, whatever may be its origin, the important consideration is this, *viz.*, that the Sense of Justice is a *primary and essential part of our moral constitution, conveying the distinct impression of certain conduct which a man owes to his fellow men*, without any regard to considerations of a personal nature, and apart from *all* positive enactments or laws.

The *requirements* of Justice embrace certain Requirements in which every man has an absolute right, and in regard to which it is the absolute duty of every man not to interfere with him.

These *rights* have usually been divided into Natural Rights. three classes :

(i.) What I have a right to possess, and what no man has a right to take from me.

(ii.) What I have a right to do, and what no man is entitled to prevent me from doing.

(iii.) What I have a right to expect from other men, and it is their absolute duty to perform.

These principles form the basis of what is termed Natural Jurisprudence, a code of relative duty deriving its authority from moral impressions which are common to all mankind.

In the actual arrangements of civil communities, these great principles are combined with others law, which are derived from expediency, their object being to promote the peace or the advantage of the community. These may differ in different

countries, and they cease to be binding when the enactments on which they rest are abrogated or changed. But the essential requirements of justice are the same in all countries and under all laws.

Justice.
(i.) Uni-
versal.
(ii.) Parti-
cular,
viz.
Distribu-
tive, and
Corrective.

The word Justice is used in *two* senses: (i.) It is used to express a *principle of individual character*; and in this sense it may be properly classed among the affections. (ii.) It is also employed to denote *distributive* and *corrective* justice.* *Distributive* justice regulates the claims of individuals in a community. *Corrective* justice requires restitution or compensation for the violation of such claims: when restitution or compensation cannot be made, it requires the punishment of the offender.

Sense of
justice
analysed.

The general *sense of justice* may be referred to the following heads: (1) attending to the *interest* of others; (2) not interfering with their *freedom of action*; (3) preserving their *reputation*; (4) estimating their *character and motives*; (5) judging of their *opinions*; (6) consulting their *feelings*; (7) preserving or improving their *moral condition*.

Rule of
conduct.

As a guide for his conduct in particular instances, a man has usually a distinct impression of what he thinks due by other men towards himself; justice requires that *he extend to others the same feelings and conduct which, in similar circumstances, he expects from them.*

1. Justice
to interest
of others.

1. Justice is due to the *persons, property, and interest* of others. This constitutes *Integrity* or *Honesty*.

* *Vide Note F, Appendix I.*

The rule for our guidance is given by the *immutable principles of moral rectitude*.

The test of our conduct in individual instances is, that it should be such as, were our own interest concerned, we should think fair and honorable in other men.

2. Justice requires us *not to interfere with the freedom of action of others*. This constitutes *Personal Liberty*. 2. Justice to freedom of action.

(a.) In all civil communities, the right is liable to certain restrictions; as when a man uses his freedom of action to the danger or injury of other men. Exceptions.

(b.) The principles of justice may also recognise a man's surrendering, to a certain extent, his personal liberty, by mutual and voluntary compact, as in the case of *servants, apprentices, soldiers, &c.*

The principles of justice, however, are opposed to *slavery*, in which the individual concerned is not a party to the arrangement. Slavery why wrong.

3. Justice is due to the *reputation* of others.

This consists (i.) in saying nothing that can injure the good name of others; (ii.) in counter-acting injurious reports; and (iii.) in not denying even to rivals the praise which is their due. 3. Justice to reputation.

The first of these rules will require modification: for it may be necessary to make a statement prejudicial to an individual, when duty to a third party, or to the public, requires us to do so. Exception to (i.)

4. Justice requires us to exercise *fairness in forming our own opinion of a man's character*. We in estimating must not suffer ourselves to be biased by passion or prejudice. 4. Justice in estimating character.

5. Justice in judging *opinions and statements of others.*
of opinions. 5. Justice is to be exercised in judging of the

6. Justice to feelings. 6. Justice is due to the *feelings of others.*

7. Justice to moral condition. 7. Injury must not be done to the *moral principles of men.* Such injuries are none the less culpable, because no human law takes cognizance of them.

II.—COMPASSION AND BENEVOLENCE.

Objects promoted by them. The exercise of the affections of *Compassion and Benevolence* is calculated to promote a double object, namely, (i.) the *alleviation of distress in others*; and (ii.) the *cultivation in ourselves of a mental condition adapted to a state of moral discipline.*

Their exercise a process of moral culture. The due cultivation of the benevolent affections is not properly to be considered as a source of moral approbation, but rather as a *process of moral culture.* They may enable us, in some degree, to benefit others, but their chief benefit is to ourselves.

Also affords mental enjoyment. The diligent exercise of them, besides being a source of moral advantage, is accompanied with a degree of *mental enjoyment* which carries with it its own reward.

Compassion and Benevo- The exercise of these affections may be treated of under the same heads as those referred to, when considering the principle of justice.

1. Compassion and benevolent exertion are to be lence analysed.
exercised in *alleviating the distresses of others.*

2. Benevolence is to be exercised towards the *reputation of others.*

3. Benevolence is to be exercised towards the *character and conduct of others.*

This consists (i.) in viewing their conduct with indulgence and forbearance ; (ii.) it also leads us to avoid all suspicion and jealousy.

4. Benevolence is to be exercised towards the *feelings of others.*

This comprehends all our social and civil connexions ; but seems peculiarly to belong to our intercourse with inferiors and dependants.

5. Benevolence is to be exercised in regard to the *moral degradation of others.*

These emotions require greater exertions for the benefit of others, and a greater sacrifice of self-love than *justice* demands. *Benevolence*, however, must not be exercised at the expense of *justice*. Compared with Justice.

III.—VERACITY.

Without a certain confidence in the veracity of Veracity mankind, society would lapse into confusion. natural to man. There is a *natural tendency to truth* in all men, unless when this principle is overcome by some strong selfish purpose ; and there is an equally strong tendency to rely on the veracity of others, until we have learnt caution by experience.

Deception would never accomplish its purpose, if there were not an impression that men generally speak the truth.

Veracity
the bond
of society.

The mutual confidence which men have in each other—both in regard to veracity of statement, and to sincerity of intention respecting engagements—is obviously the bond of all society. It is indispensable to every civil community, being the basis both of commerce and polity.

Veracity
analysed.

The *elements* essential to veracity as a moral emotion are *three*, viz.:

1. Correct *ascertainment* of facts.
2. Accurate *statement* of facts.
3. Faithful fulfilment of promises.

1. *Correct
ascertain-
ment of
facts.*

1. *Correct ascertainment of facts* is essential to the Love of Truth.

In the reception of facts, especially on the evidence of testimony, we acquire by experience a degree of caution arising from having been sometimes deceived.

In minds of a certain description, this caution produces a suspicion with regard to all evidence. Hence springs *Scepticism*.

Scepti-
cism.

Credulity. The neglecting to exercise necessary caution leads to *Credulity*.

The proper state of mind is a mean between these two extremes.

2. *Accura-
cy in state-
ment of
facts.*

2. The exercise of *veracity in the statement of facts*, [whether derived from our personal observation, or received by testimony from others.

(i.) There must be scrupulous accuracy in relating facts, and (ii.) statements must be so framed as to convey a correct impression to the hearer.

Such veracity is opposed to every kind of fallacy, whether direct or indirect.

Direct Fallacy may consist (i.) in the alleged facts being absolutely false; or (ii.) in some being so; (iii.) in facts being kept out of view which would give a different import to the whole statement; or (iv.) in some of the facts being distorted so as to alter the impression conveyed by them.

But, besides such actual fallacy, there are various methods by which a statement literally true may be so related as to convey an erroneous impression. The following are instances :

(i.) Facts may be connected in such a manner as to *give the appearance of a relation of cause and effect*, when they are entirely unconnected. *Thus* the character of an individual may be assumed from a single act, which, if the truth were known, might be seen to be opposed to his real disposition, and accounted for by the circumstances in which he happened at the time to be placed.

(ii.) Events may be connected, which were entirely disjoined, and unfounded conclusions may be deduced from this fictitious conjunction. *Thus* a false impression may be conveyed respecting the conduct of an individual, (a.) by assigning motives which are entirely imaginary; (b.) by connecting things which have no relation; (c.) by keeping out of view circumstances which would lead to an explanation of his conduct; or (d.) by attaching to his words a different meaning from that which he intended to convey by them.

To this kind of veracity (*viz.* 2), *Sincerity* is to be referred. It consists in giving to others an

honest and fair impression of our views, motives, and intentions. It is opposed to Hypocrisy and Flattery.

By *Hypocrisy* a man disguises his real sentiments, and professes principles foreign to his nature, for the purpose of promoting his selfish interest.

Hypocri-
sy.

Simula-
tion, Dissi-
mulation.

There are two distinct forms of hypocrisy, viz.: *Simulation* and *Dissimulation*.

Simulation is the assumption of a character which does not belong to a man. *Dissimulation* is the concealment of what one really is.

Flattery. / *Flattery* is opposed to sincerity, because it tends to give an individual a false impression of our opinion regarding him; and likewise leads him to form a false estimate of his own character.

3. Keeping promises. 3. The third element of veracity is *faithful fulfilment of Promises.**

IV.—FRIENDSHIP, LOVE, AND GRATITUDE.

These affections are so nearly allied that they may be considered together.

Characterised. They consist in a personal and peculiar attachment to an individual, founded either upon some qualities in himself, or some benefits he has conferred on us, or on some one in whom we are interested. The feelings and conduct to which they give rise correspond with those referred to under Justice and Benevolence; but, in many instances, they lead to a much greater sacrifice of personal interest and comfort, than usually proceeds either from justice or simple benevolence.

* *Vide Note G, Appendix I.*

V.—PATRIOTISM.

Patriotism is, perhaps, not properly to be considered as a distinct principle of our nature, but rather as a result of a combination of the other affections.

It leads us, by every means in our power, to ~~Charac-~~ promote the peace and prosperity of our country, ~~terised.~~ and to discourage whatever tends to the contrary.

VI.—THE DOMESTIC AFFECTIONS.

In this class are included: (i.) Conjugal Affection; ~~Enumerat-~~
 (ii.) the Parental and (iii.) Filial Affections; and ~~ed.~~
 (iv.) the Affections of Kindred.

THE DEFENSIVE AFFECTIONS.

The Defensive affections are (i.) Jealousy, (ii.) ~~Enumerat-~~
 Anger, and (iii.) Resentment. ~~ed.~~

These are a part of our moral constitution, and ~~Charac-~~
 are calculated to answer important purposes, ~~pro-~~ terised.
 vided they are kept under the control of reason
 and the moral principle.

Their proper object is primarily a sense of blame- ~~Object.~~
 able conduct in others, and they lead us to adopt
 suitable measures for protecting ourselves against
 such conduct.

Resentment, in cases which concern the *public* ~~Legal pun-~~ ~~ishment.~~
peace, leads to the infliction of punishment, the
 object of which is to prevent crime and wrong-
 doing, not to gratify personal vengeance. Hence
 such punishment should be inflicted (1) in a
 public manner, (2) with proper deliberation, and
 (3) with an exact adaptation of the penalty to the

offence, and to the object to be attained. As the person injured is not likely to act with the requisite impartiality and candour, tribunals have been established in all civilised countries for trying and punishing public offenders.

When un-
duly exer-
cised.

The defensive affections are exercised in an unwarranted manner, (1) when they are allowed to be excited by trifling causes ; (2) when they are, in degree, disproportionate to the offence, or prolonged in a manner which it did not require ; and (3) when they lead, in any measure, to retaliation or revenge.*

Dr. Whe-
well's divi-
sion of mov-
ing powers.

* The Desires and Affections are classified by Dr. Whewell in the following manner :—(i.) Bodily Desires or Appetites ; (ii.) Affections, all included under (a.) Love, and (b.) Anger ; (iii.) Mental Desires, *viz.*, (a.) Desire of Safety ; (b.) Desire of Having ; (c.) Desire of Family Society ; (d.) Desire of Civil Society ; (e.) Need of a Mutual Understanding ; (f.) Desire of Superiority ; (g.) Desire of Knowledge.

His scheme
of active
principles.

His Classification of the *active principles*,—or *springs of human action*, as he terms them, is as follows : (i.) Appetites ; (ii.) Affections ; (iii.) Mental Desires ; (iv.) Moral Sentiments, *viz.*, (a.) Approval, and (b.) Disapprobation ; (v.) Reflex Sentiments, *viz.*, (a.) Desire of being loved ; (b.) Desire of Esteem ; (c.) Desire of our own approval.

Objects of
active prin-
ciples.

The Appetites have for their objects, *things*; the Affections, *persons*; the Mental Desires, *abstractions*; the Moral Sentiments, *actions*; and the Reflex Sentiments, the *thoughts of other persons, or our own, about ourselves*.

Reflex
thought.

[*Reflex*.—The mind may be directed either (i.) to what is *external*, or (ii.) to *itself*. Process (i.) precedes, and is necessary for process (ii.). Process (i.) furnishes the mind with materials ; and by process (ii.) it is *directed back* upon itself thus furnished ; hence such thought is termed *reflex* thought.]

Attention, Habit, and Moral Approbation, in connection with the Affections.

We now proceed to discuss, with reference to the affections generally, the three following points:

I.—The influence of *attention*, combined with a certain act of *imagination*;

II.—The influence of *habit*; and

III.—The feeling of *moral approbation*, which the exercise of the affections is calculated to produce.

I.—*Attention.* In every exercise of the affections, a most important influence is produced by *attention*, aided by a certain act of *imagination*. This consists in directing the mind earnestly to all the considerations which ought to guide us in the particular relation to which the affection refers. It leads us to place ourselves in the situation of others; and thus to judge of the emotions and conduct which are due from us to them.

This mental exercise constitutes what is termed *Sympathy*.

It is composed of an act of *imagination and self-love*, by which we place ourselves in the situation of other men, and regulate our conduct towards them as if we were ourselves concerned.

The principle of self-love thus brought into action is merely to be the *test*, and not the *rule* of our conduct.

The *application of self-love* is chiefly useful in enabling us to appreciate the facts of the individual case, as if we were personally interested.

Rule of
conduct.

The *rule of our conduct* is quite distinct from this, and rests on those principles of justice and compassion which form a part of our moral constitution. Practically these principles are much aided by conscience.

II. Influ-
ence of
habit on
affections.

II.—*Habit*.—Next we have to notice the influence produced upon the affections by *habit*.

The tendency of all *emotions* is to become weaker by repetition. The tendency of *actions* is to become easier by repetition.

Law.

Now an affection consists of an *emotion leading to an action*; and the natural course is, that the *emotion becomes less acutely felt, as the action becomes easier and more familiar*.

Action il-
lustrated.

Thus, a scene of misery will produce in the inexperienced an intensity of emotion not felt by the veteran philanthropist. The calmness of the latter is not due to insensibility, but is an indication of the healthy and natural progress of the mind; *intensity of feeling* being by degrees exchanged for a *habit of active benevolence*.

Precau-
tion.

It is essential to the preservation of the moral harmony, that the *emotion should be steadily followed by the corresponding action*. If this be not the case, cold insensibility or barren selfishness must ensue.

III. In-
fluence of
moral ap-
probation
on affec-
tions.

III.—*Moral Approbation*.—The third point to be considered is the *feeling of moral approbation* or rather the impression of merit, which is frequently attached to the exercise of the affections. The affections are a part of our *moral constitution*, intended to bind us together by certain ties. The violation of these feelings may degrade a man morally; but the performance of

them does not entitle him to merit. An extensive culture of the affections may go on without the recognition of the moral principle. We are only entitled to acknowledge the operation of this principle, when the affections are exercised so as to entail a complete sacrifice of self, and an earnest devotion to the highest duties of human life.

The *affections* serve a purpose in our moral economy analogous to that which the *appetites* answer in our physical system. The appetite of hunger, for example, ensures a regular supply of nourishment, in a manner which could never have been provided for by any process of reasoning; though an exercise of reason is still applicable in order to control it. In the same manner the various affections have each a defined purpose to answer, both in respect to our own mental economy and our relations to our fellow men: and in the due exercise of them, they ought to be controlled by the moral principle.

Here we would notice that there is a *compensating power among the affections* themselves, by which, in the intercourse of men, they act as checks upon each other. (a.) Thus resentment acts as a check upon injustice; and the dread of exciting anger in others has probably an influence in preserving the peace of society, which we often ascribe to a higher principle. (b.) In regard to the affections more strictly benevolent, these are also influenced, in a similar manner, by the feeling of disapprobation which attends any remarkable departure from their requirements.

In regard to both the affections and the desires, Due regulation we must bear in mind how greatly the happiness of ^{lation} affec-

fects happiness of each individual.

each individual is influenced by a due regulation of these feelings. Pure mental enjoyment belongs to him whose affections are well regulated, and whose desires are properly directed.

Temper.

The disposition which results from that arrangement of the desires and affections which is peculiar to any individual or class of individuals, is termed *Temper*.

Whewell on the Affections.

The Affections are *tendencies* or *cravings* directed towards conscious individuals. But the Affections are not mere tendencies or cravings, they are *internal Emotions* or *Feelings* : being directed to persons, not to things, they mould the thoughts in a way quite different from what the appetites do.

The two principal Affections are (i.) *Love* and (ii.) *Anger*.

Under Love are included ;—(a.) Maternal and Paternal Love ; (b.) Filial Love ; (c.) Fraternal Love ; (d.) Conjugal Love. Also (e.) Friendship, and (f.) Patriotism.

(i.) Love subdivided.

Anger also appears in various forms. It comes into play against any one who assaults or threatens us ; and, giving vehemence and rapidity to our actions, aids us in self defence. (a.) Anger in this form, is the natural repulsion and return to any harm which falls upon us or approaches us, and is called *Resentment*, as being the sentiment which is a natural reaction to the hostile sentiment of any other person. As men feel sudden Resentment against a sudden attack, (b.) they feel *Permanent Anger* against those who have inflicted or endeavour to inflict pain or harm upon them, or whose desires come in conflict with theirs, (c.) when this feeling is no longer a burst of emotion, but a settled and steady feeling, it is *Hatred*, *Malice*, or *Ill-will*, (d.) when malice prompts men to return pain and harm to them from whom they have received pain or harm, it is *Revenge*.

(ii.) Anger subdivided.

SECTION 3.—SELF-LOVE.

There is, in our constitution, *a propensity* Self-love defined, and characterised. which leads us to study our own interest, and which, in many instances, becomes the ruling principle of the character. This principle is a part of our moral constitution, calculated to answer important ends, if it be kept in its proper place, and not allowed to encroach upon the duties which we owe to other men.

When duly regulated, it coincides with *Prudence* Prudence and Selfishness. or a just regard to our own interest; when indulged in to excess, it becomes *Selfishness*.

A rational self-love ought to lead us to seek our own true happiness, and should prove a check upon those appetites and passions which interfere with this object. It should lead us to avoid every thing calculated to impair peace of mind and the harmony of our moral feelings. The desires, therefore, must be duly regulated; and the affections duly exercised.

This rational self-love is placed as a regulating principle among the other powers, inferior *moral-* A regulating principle, analogous to conscience. *socially* to the principle of conscience, but calculated to answer important purposes.

Its influence rests simply on the impression that *satisfaction* accompanies a certain state of the desires and affections; while *pain* is the consequence of an opposite state. On what its influence depends.

Among the sources of satisfaction we may reckon: Sources of satisfaction.

(i.) The pleasure attached to the exercise of the affections themselves.

(ii.) The mental peace and enjoyment which spring from benevolence, friendship, and the other kindly feelings.

(iii.) The gratitude of those who have experienced the effects of our kindness.

(iv.) The respect and approbation of those whose esteem we value.

(v.) The return of similar affections and good offices from other men.

Sources of pain. The following are some of the *pains* which belong to an ill-regulated state of the moral feelings.

(i.) The mental agony which arises from jealousy, envy, hatred, and resentment.

(ii.) The distress which often springs from the contempt and disapprobation of our fellow-men.

(iii.) The dissatisfaction and self-reproach which follow any neglect of a due exercise of the affections; which to a well-regulated mind is quite as distressing as the disapprobation of other men.

To run the risk of such evils for the gratification of present appetite or passion, is clearly opposed to a sound self-love.

When a regulating principle. When self-love prevails over an appetite or a passion, it then operates as a *regulating principle* in the moral system.

Distinct from *conscience*. But this principle in its nature is quite distinct from that of *conscience*, which impels us to act in obedience to duty apart from all personal considerations.

This distinction, which is one of importance, shows that there is a principle of regulation among the moral feelings, leading to an exercise of the affec-

tions which contributes largely to the well-being of society, but which does not entitle the agent to moral approbation or merit.

As *self-love* leads us to consult our own interest while the *affections* lead us to regard the advantage of others, a certain balance between these principles is necessary to secure our moral well-being. The affections are seldom likely to acquire undue influence, but there is great danger that self-love may degenerate into selfishness, and thus interfere with the duties which we owe to others.

When the principles of utility have been urged in vain against the practice of selfishness, an appeal must be made to conscience. This appeal is not unfrequently successful.

Hence the moral principle or sense of duty, when it is made the regulating motive of action, is calculated to control self-love, and preserve the balance between it and the affections.

When the principle of self-love becomes deranged in its exercise and objects, it leads to those habits by which a man *seeks his own gratification, in a way which interferes with his duties to other men.*

This will be the case whenever a man indulges to excess any of the desires, whether Avarice, Ambition, or Love of Fame.

Even deeds of benevolence and kindness may be so performed as to minister to selfishness.

There must be a balance between self-love and the affections.

Balance when lost how restored.

Self-love when deranged.

PART II.

OF THE WILL.

Will de-
fined.

Will or simple volition is that *state of mind which immediately precedes action.*^{*}

We will a certain act, and the act follows, unless prevented by external restraint, or by physical inability to perform it.

Action
arises from
a mental
emotion.

The *actions* thus produced arise out of the *desires and the affections.* Between the mental emotion and the action, several steps intervene. The following is the *complete process:*

1. Mental
emotion.

1. We *desire* an object, or we experience an *affection.*

2. Interro-
gation.

2. *Interrogation* then follows. Shall we gratify the desire? Shall we exercise the affection?

3. Deli-
beration,
or weigh-
ing of mo-
tives.

3. Now commences the process of *deliberation.* We perceive a variety of considerations or inducements, some favouring the emotion, others opposed to it. We, therefore, proceed to weigh the relative force of these antagonistic *motives*, in order to determine which of them is to regulate our decision.

4. Deter-
mination.

4. Having given the preference to some one among the several motives, we then determine either to do the act, or to abstain from action.

5. Will-
ing.

Let us suppose we *determine to do the act.* 5. This determination to act is followed by the mental condition of *willing or simple volition.*

Motives.

In the above chain of mental operations, a class of agents is brought into view which act upon the

* *Vide Note H, Appendix I.*

mind as *moral causes of its volitions*. These are termed *motives*, or principles of action.

These moral causes influence the determinations of the mind with a uniformity similar to that which we observe in the operation of physical causes.

For the *due operation* of these moral causes, certain circumstances are required in the individual in the individual. Requisites on whom they are expected to operate.

1. He must be fully informed of them as truths 1. Knowledge. addressed to his understanding.

2. He must direct his attention to them with 2. Attention. suitable intensity, and exercise his reasoning powers upon their tendencies.

3. He must be himself in a sound moral 3. Sound moral state. condition.

In all our intercourse with mankind, we proceed upon an absolute confidence in the uniformity of the operation of these causes, *provided we are acquainted with the moral condition of the individual.*

Thus (a.) one man, we feel certain, is absolutely Uniformity of action illustrated. to be relied on in given circumstances; another cannot be trusted if any thing should come in the way, affecting his own pleasure or interest; *(b.)* in endeavoring to *excite various individuals to the same conduct* in a particular case, we learn that, *(i.)* in one, we have to appeal to *a sense of duty*, *(ii.)* in another, to *a love of approbation*, *(iii.)* in a third, to *purely selfish feelings*; *(c.)* again, when we find that, in a particular individual, certain motives fail of the effects which we have observed them to produce in others, we endeavour to impress them upon his mind; and this we do from a conviction,

that these truths influence uniformly the volitions of an individual, provided he can be induced seriously to attend to them, and provided he is in a suitable moral condition.

Motives
classified.

The following are the principal *motives* by which volition is determined.*

1. Self-love.

1. *Self-love*, which prompts a man to seek his own interest, or gratification.

2. Certain affections.

2. *Certain affections* which lead him to consider the duties which he owes to other men; such as *justice, benevolence, &c.*

3. Moral rectitude.

3. The *impression of moral rectitude* or moral responsibility. This is derived from the principle of conscience.

4. Reason.

4. *Reason* or *judgment*, which leads a man to perceive certain tendencies of actions apart from their moral aspect.

Action of
motives
illustrated.

Now let us suppose that a line of conduct has to be decided on;

(i.) In some case which immediately involves the interest of other men :

(a.) Pure
selfishness.

(a.) One man will make every thing tend to his own interest or pleasure.

(b.) Motives al-
truistic in
effect, but
self-re-
gardant in
agent.

(b.) Another will surrender a portion of his personal gratification to the advantage of others, purely as an exercise of feeling from which he experiences satisfaction. In such men, the amount of personal interest which they are willing to sacrifice to the principle of action, is a matter for calculation.

* *Determination of volition* is equivalent to *decision of conduct or action*.

(c.) A third will contemplate the case purely as one of duty or moral responsibility: and will act upon this principle, though it may involve a considerable amount of self-sacrifice.

(ii.) Let the case, now refer to one of the desires having no *immediate* relation to the interest of other men.

(a.) One man directly gratifies the desire. Pure self-fishness.

(b.) Another considers the influence which the indulgence of it would be likely to have on his health, interest, or reputation. This may be considered as an exercise of *judgment, combined with self-love*.

(c.) A third views it purely as a question of Moral responsibility, and decides on this ground ^{ponsibility.} alone.

Thus we have presented to us *three* characters.

1st.—One who acts upon *moral principle*—(corresponding to c). 1. Moral principle.

2nd.—One who acts from motives of a *personal nature*, though his conduct may, in certain cases, be the same. (Corresponding to b.) 2. Self-rewarding motives.

3rd.—One who goes *straight forward to the gratification* of the ruling desire or governing propensity. (Corresponding to a.) 3. Selfish motives.

The *first* is a uniform character, on whose conduct we can depend with implicit confidence. For we know the uniform tendencies of the motives or moral causes by which he is habitually influenced, and we know his moral temperament. *First* may be relied on.

The *third* has also a uniformity of conduct, though of a very different kind. We know like-*Third* may be relied on.

wise his moral condition, and to predict his conduct, we require only to learn the particular inducement to which he is exposed in a given instance.

*Second
cannot be
relied on.*

The *second* we cannot rely upon ; for we have not the means of tracing the conflicting views by which he may be influenced in a particular case, or the principle on which he may ultimately decide between them.

*Why men
act differ-
ently with
same
motives
before
them.*

We now proceed to consider the principles on which we may explain the fact, that *the wills of individuals may be influenced differently with the same motives before them.*

These principles may be referred to *three heads* :

I.—Knowledge.

II.—Attention.

III.—Moral Habits.

*I. Influ-
ence of
knowledge.*

I. A *primary* and essential element in the due regulation of the will, is a correct *knowledge of the truths and motives* which influence its determinations. Such truths are those of religion, whether natural or revealed. The truths of natural religion are derived partly from the phenomena of nature which are continually before us ; and partly from our own moral constitution. The perfection and infinite wisdom of God may be deduced from the *works of nature*. To his moral attributes, there is a witness in the *conscience* of each man.

*Attributes
of God
derived
from na-
ture and
conscience.*

II. The next important requisite is *attention*. We must habitually attend to moral facts and

*II. Influ-
ence of
Attention.*

principles, so as to bring their influence to bear upon its exercise of our volitions. This, it is manifest, is a *voluntary* exercise of the thinking and reasoning faculties.

When a particular desire is present to the mind—

1°—A man has the *power to act* (a.) upon the first impulse, or (b.) upon a partial view of the motives by which he ought to be influenced ; and

2°—He has the *power to suspend acting*, and direct his attention to the principles which are calculated to guide his determination.

The *direction of the attention to the requisite principles* (a.), is the first link in the chain of sequences which belong to the regulation of the will ; (b.) it is what every one is conscious of ; and (c.) it is that which constitutes man a free and responsible agent.

In the process here alluded to :

(i.) The *first* mental state is a certain movement of one of the Desires, or one of the Affections. The term *Inclination* will include both.

(ii.) The *second* is a reference of the inclination to the moral causes or motives which more particularly apply to it, especially the indications of conscience and the principles of moral rectitude. *Three cases* here offer themselves for consideration :

(a.) 1. If the principles of moral rectitude be found to harmonise with the inclination, volition and action follow, with the full concurrence of every moral feeling. 2. If the inclination be condemned by these principles, it is, in a well-regulated mind, instantly dismissed.

(b.) But this voluntary process may be neglected : the inclination may be suffered to engross the

Attention, first step in regulating process.

Process analysed.

(i.) Inclination.

(ii.) Reference of Inclination to appropriate motive.

mind, and occupy fully the attention : the power may not be exercised of directing it to moral causes, and of comparing with them the inclination which is present. The consequence may be that the man runs *heedlessly* into volition and action.

(c.) ¹ The moral causes may be so far regarded as to prevent the inclination from being followed by action ; while the inclination is still cherished, and the mind is allowed to dwell, with regret, on the object which it had been obliged to deny itself. Though the actual deed be thus prevented, the harmony of the moral feelings is destroyed. ² Akin to this is another mental condition in which the harmony of the moral feelings may be destroyed without the action following. This will take place when the inclination is cherished, as before, in opposition to conscience ; while the action is opposed by some inferior motives, as a regard to reputation or interest.

III. Moral Habit. III.—From repeated performance of the mental operation above described (*vide* II.), there gradually results a *Moral Habit*.

Moral Habit characterised. The term Moral Habit implies a mental condition, in which a desire or an affection, repeatedly acted upon, is, after each repetition, acted upon with less and less effort : and, on the other hand, a truth or moral principle, which has been repeatedly passed over without adequate attention, after every such act, makes less and less impression, until at length it ceases to exert any influence over the moral feelings or the conduct.

At first a wrong deed requires an effort, and a contest with moral principles; it is soon followed by a *feeling of regret*. This is the *voice of conscience*. Its monitions are weakened after each repetition of the deed; the judgment at length becomes perverted respecting the great moral principles; and acts, at first strenuously resisted, are performed without remorse, or with but faint perception of their moral aspect.

The principle of Habit applies equally to any species of conduct, or any train of mental operations, which, by frequent repetition, have become so familiar, as not to be accompanied by a recognition of the principles in which they have originated.

In this manner good habits are continued without any immediate sense of the right principles by which they were formed; but they arose from their *constantly acting upon* those principles, and on this ^{merit} is founded the moral approbation which we attach to such habits.

In the same manner vice or the neglect of any duty may become habitual, a sense of the principles violated being lost. This loss arose from a *frequent violation* of the principles, till they gradually lost their power over the conduct: and in this consists the guilt of bad habits.

It is important to notice that character consists chiefly in habits, and that habits arise out of individual actions and individual mental operations.

In *overcoming evil habits*, the laws above indicated must be carefully observed. When the judgment, influenced by conscience, is convinced that a habit is injurious, the attention must be

earnestly directed to the truths which produced this impression. There will thus arise a desire to be delivered from the habit. The desire being encouraged, is continually brought to bear upon the evil propensity. At first a considerable effort is required, but after each successful resistance less effort is necessary, until at length the new course of action is confirmed, and the evil habit is quite overpowered.

Aristotle on
the relation
between Ha-
bit and Vir-
tue.

“ Virtue being two-fold, one part *intellectual* and the other *moral*; *intellectual* virtue has its origin and increase for the most part from teaching; therefore it stands in need of experience and time; but *moral* virtue arises from *habit*. Whence it is clear, that not one of the moral virtues spring up in us by nature, for none of those things which exist by nature, experience alteration from habit. The virtues are produced in us neither by nature, nor contrary to nature, but we are naturally adapted to receive them; and this natural capacity is perfected by *Habit*.”

Virtue de-
fined.

According to Aristotle, virtue consists “in the *habit* of mediocrity according to right reason.” Every virtue lies in a mean between two opposite vices: thus *fortitude* is a mean between the opposite extremes of *cowardice* and *rashness*.

PART III.

OF THE MORAL PRINCIPLE OR CONSCIENCE.

No one can deny, *as a fact*, that there is a Feeling of mental exercise, by which we *feel* certain actions ^{right and wrong, a fact.} to be *right* and certain others *wrong*.

It is an element of our moral nature which can neither be analysed, nor explained. It is an *ultimate principle*, forcing itself upon the conviction of every man who inspects his own mind. ^{It cannot be analysed.}

The *evidence* for the existence and nature of this principle is entirely *within*. The *consciousness* of every man testifies, that there is a monitor which, in particular cases, (a.) warns him of the conduct which he ought to pursue; and (b.) solemnly admonishes him when he has departed from it. Besides the impression which judgment conveys to us regarding the tendencies and *general* qualities of actions, we have a feeling which leads us to regard actions with approbation or disapprobation, in reference purely to *their moral aspect*, and without any reference to their consequences. ^{Evidence for existence within.}

The *province* of conscience is, to convey to man ^{Conscience, its province.} a certain conviction of what is morally right and wrong in regard to conduct in individual cases, and in regard to the general exercise of the desires or affections.

It attains its object (a.) independently of any ^{Mode of} acquired knowledge, and (b.) without reference to ^{action.} any other standard of duty.

It carries within itself a *rule of right*, which it applies to the primary moral feelings (*i. e.*, the

desires and affections), so as to determine whether they are duly balanced, or otherwise.

The *desires* direct us to gratifications which we feel to be *worthy of acquirement*; and the *affections* lead us to conduct which we feel to be *agreeable to ourselves, or useful to others*.

Conscience, however, leads us to perform actions simply because we feel them *to be right*, and to abstain from others simply because we feel them *to be wrong*, without regard to any other impression, or to the consequences of the actions either to ourselves or others.

Conscience holds a place among the moral powers, analogous to that which reason holds among the intellectual.

By certain intellectual operations man (*a.*) acquires the knowledge of a series of facts; (*b.*) he remembers them; (*c.*) he separates and classifies them, and forms them into new combinations. But with the most active exercise of all these operations, his mind might present an accumulation of facts, without order or principle of combination. It is *reason* that arranges and harmonizes the whole mass, by comparing, distinguishing, and tracing their true analogies and relations, and lastly by deducing truths as conclusions from the whole. When reason is *suspended*, the intellectual harmony is at an end. The visions of the mind are acted upon as facts; the real relations of things are distorted; inappropriate conduct is indulged in; and ends are aimed at by means which are not adapted to them.

Rank
of con-
science.

Analogy
between
Reason
and Con-
science.

Reason.

In this process there is a striking analogy to the moral feelings, and to the control exercised over them by *conscience*. By *self-love* a man is led to seek his own gratification; and the *desires* direct him to certain objects by which this end may be attained. The *affections* lead him to regard other men, and so to conform to the principles of justice, veracity, and benevolence. *Conscience* is the regulating power, which, acting upon the *desires* and *affections* as reason does upon a series of facts, preserves among them harmony and order. When conscience is suspended, *self-love* degenerates into selfishness: the *desires* are indulged with no other restraint than a regard to health or reputation: the *affections* are exercised in a similar manner, present and momentary impulses being acted upon, without any regard to future results.

In all this violation of moral harmony, there is no derangement of the judgment; but there is a total derangement of the sense of moral relations. Such a condition of mind would appear to be in reference to the moral feelings, what insanity is in regard to the intellectual.

One of the most important purposes answered by conscience, is to make us acquainted with the *moral attributes of the Deity*. It conveys this knowledge with the aid of reason.

From a simple exercise of the mind, directed to the great phenomena of nature, we acquire the knowledge of a being of *infinite power and wisdom*, the great *first cause*; we learn, with a feeling of equal certainty, the *goodness* of the Deity from the provision he has made for supplying the wants of

all his creatures. A being thus endowed with infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, we cannot conceive to exist without *moral attributes*. We arrive at a distinct knowledge of these moral attributes, by an easy process, when, from the moral perceptions of our own mind, we infer the moral attributes of our Creator. The divine moral attributes must, of course, infinitely exceed in degree the corresponding attributes in man.

How the regulating power of Conscience is preserved or lost.

Truths which act as moral causes through conscience

It has been already observed that there is a certain relation between the *truths* which act upon us as moral causes, and the *mental emotions* which ought to result from them; and between these *emotions* and a *certain conduct* which they tend to produce. If harmony is preserved among these, a sound moral condition will be the result: but whenever this harmony is violated, a disturbing influence is introduced, which will ultimately derange the whole moral economy.

Similar observations apply to the operation of those *truths*, which, under the regulating *power of conscience*, are calculated to act as moral causes on our minds.

viz.:
Religious Truths.

Such are the truths which relate to the *character and perfections of the Deity*.

By directing the mind to these truths, corresponding emotions will arise. These are:

Emotions they produce.

(a.) A sense of veneration towards the Deity, as infinitely great, wise, and powerful.

(b.) A sense of love and thankfulness towards Him, as infinitely good.

(c.) Habitual regard to the authority and will of God as a moral governor of purity and justice, and as requiring a corresponding character in all his creatures.

A close and constant relation ought to be preserved between these truths and these emotions, and on this depends the moral harmony of the mind. On what Moral Harmony depends.

For the preservation of the moral harmony, the following process is necessary : How it is preserved.

(a.) The mind must be carefully directed to the truths.

(b.) The emotions will naturally follow.

(c.) These emotions must then be encouraged. •

(d.) Right action will be the final result.

If the *first* step (a.) is neglected, the effect will be prejudicial to the emotions and the conduct which ought to flow from them. This effect will be aggravated if there has been any previous moral derangement—if deeds have been committed, desires cherished, or mental habits acquired, by which conscience has been violated. How it is lost.

When the moral derangement is far advanced, the understanding itself may become distorted regarding the first principles of moral truth. The mind will then prefer its own discordant speculations to the simple truths which conscience naturally suggests. When lost, the Judgment may become impaired.

INFLUENCE OF ATTENTION ON OUR MORAL DECISIONS.*

Attention
charac-
terised.

Attention consists in directing the thoughts, calmly and deliberately, to all the facts and considerations by which we ought to be influenced in any particular case.

It is *voluntary*, and, on the degree in which it is habitually exercised, depend the different moral conditions of different men.

Morbid
mental
state how
dependent
on Attention.

The morbid mental state in which moral causes have lost their proper influence both on the will and the judgment, is much influenced by attention.

This morbid state *originates* in a distortion of moral feelings, in consequence of which the inclinations become perverted: its primary *effect*, however, and that by which it is perpetuated, is a constant misdirection of the *attention*, a total neglect of the truths and emotions by which the moral decisions ought to be influenced.

Effects of
inatten-
tion.

For want of attention men are led away, by *passion* and *prejudice*, into courses of action which their *sober* judgment condemns.

Attention
first step
in Repen-
tance.

When the profligate would repent of his errors, he must first of all *attend* to the truths by which his moral decisions ought to be influenced; conscience will then assist, and thus just moral conclusions will be arrived at.

Relation
between
our moral
emotions

An intimate relation exists between *all our moral emotions* and processes which are entirely *voluntary*.

* The influence of attention on Belief has been considered under the Intellectual Powers. *Vide Analysis*, p. 39.

- These emotions are not the immediate objects of volition, nor do they arise directly at our bidding, but they are the natural result of certain intellectual processes, and even of certain bodily actions, both of which are entirely voluntary. *Thus, the emotions of compassion and benevolence* are the natural result of scenes of distress. We can, *if we will*, place ourselves in contact with distress, and thus excite our sympathy.

There are *three* distinct processes to be noticed, *Three processes, viz.* two of which are *voluntary*:

1. (*Voluntary.*) A man has it entirely in his power to *place himself* in the requisite circumstances.

2. Having thus placed himself, a *train of emotions will arise* in the mind, and prompt him to action.

3. (*Voluntary.*) These emotions must then be *acted upon*. Such action is under the control of the will.

If all the three are duly performed, the result is *Results*. a sound moral condition.

If either of the voluntary processes should be neglected, the moral harmony will be disturbed.

NATURE AND ORIGIN OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS.

Our *moral feelings* are to be regarded as implanted in us by the Creator, for guidance in the ordinary relations of life.

First as to the *nature* of the simple idea of right and wrong:^{*}

* *Vide Note I, Appendix I.*

(i.) Simple idea as to act.

(i.) We have a conviction (*a.*) that some actions are *obligatory* on all men, and (*b.*) that others violate our notion of obligation. Actions of the first kind (*a.*) are termed *right*, those of the second kind (*b.*) *wrong*.

(ii.) Simple idea as to agent.

(ii.) Actions are right with respect to the agent, only when the *intentions* are good. If the intention is *good*, we award *praise*; if *evil*, *blame*.

2º Origin of virtue.

Secondly, as to the *origin* of the impression of right and wrong. On *what grounds* do we conclude certain actions to be right, and certain others wrong?

Two accounts.

Two answers have been given to this question, by two opposite schools of moralists:

1. Virtue dependent.

(1.) According to one school, we conclude that actions are right or wrong simply from a view of their *consequences to ourselves or others*.

2. Virtue independent.

(2.) According to the other school, we proceed upon an *absolute conviction of certain conduct being right, and certain other conduct being wrong*, without looking beyond the simple act, or the simple intention of the agent. According to this school, *right* and *wrong* do not necessarily involve any consideration of the effects or the tendencies of the action.

THEORIES OF MORALS.

Independent.

(A.) On the one hand, it is contended, that our moral impressions are in themselves *immutable*, and that an absolute conviction of their immutability is fixed upon us in that part of our constitution which we call *conscience*.

(B.) On the other hand, it is maintained, that * Dependent these distinctions are *entirely arbitrary*, or arise out of *circumstances*.

Those who adopt the latter opinion (B.) have Theories† to explain *what the circumstances are which give rise to our impressions of vice and virtue, moral approbation or disapprobation.* The various modes of explanation have led to as many different *theories of morals.* Some of these we now proceed to notice :

I. *Artificial System*—Mandeville.‡

Mandeville propounded a theory of morals, the nature of which will appear from the following passage :

“Man, like all other animals, has an irresistible inclination to follow the bent of his own desires. Force, though it may soften the rude features of his character, will prove inadequate to raise him to that state of moral and political improvement of which his nature seems capable. Hence the politicians and law-givers seeing how necessary it was that the passions should be circumscribed within limits, on studying the nature of his being, found him possessed of a vastly superior portion of pride to other animals, and perceived that the most effectual way to

I. System
of Mandeville.

Virtue is
the artifi-
cial effect
of Policy
and Pride;
private
vices are
public
benefits.

* The term *dependent* signifies that the distinction between right and wrong is not an ultimate one, but that it depends on something else, as, for example, (1) pleasure, or (2) utility, or (3) legal enactment, or (4) social compact.

† It will be observed, that Abercrombie carefully avoids applying the term *theory* to (A.) He speaks of *Theories of Morals* as arising solely from (B.)

‡ *Vide Note K, Appendix I.*

restrain his inclinations and make him labour zealously for the public welfare was by operating on his passion. Accordingly, having won an entrance to his heart by compliments on his sagacity and understanding, they begin to teach him the notions of honour and shame, representing the former as the highest good, and the latter as the greatest evil which could befall him. The moral virtues do not owe their origin to any general principle, but are the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride."

Criticism of theory. Abercrombie in criticising this theory, remarks that it is sufficient to point out the distinction between *immutable* principles of morality and those arrangements which merely depend upon legal enactments. A change of the law changes the character of these arrangements, since they do not possess in themselves the qualities of merit or demerit. No laws can alter those great principles of morality which are written upon the consciences of all men.*

* Abercrombie notices a modification of this system, by which our impressions of virtue and vice are derived entirely from *mutual compact*. Men, finding that there was a certain course of action which would contribute to their mutual advantage, entered into an agreement to observe certain conduct, and abstain from certain other. The violation of this compact constituted vice, the observance of it, virtue.

Puffendorf, (b. 1632 in Saxony, d. 1694) deduced the laws of Morality from social compact. Hobbes—of whom Puffendorf was a follower—derived our ideas of moral obligation from political compact. Godwin, (b. 1756 in Cambridgeshire, d. 1836) in more recent times, taught that the moral condition of mankind depends solely on their social and political institutions. The writings of Godwin, however, were of a practical nature: he did not discuss the metaphysical question regarding the *origin* of moral distinctions.

II. *Rational System*—Clarke.*II. System
of Clarke.

Clarke maintained that virtue depends on a conformity of the conduct to a certain *eternal fitness* of things. "From the eternal and necessary differences of things," he says, "there necessarily and naturally arise certain moral obligations, which are in themselves incumbent upon all rational creatures, antecedent to all positive institution and all expectation of rewards and punishments."

III. *Rational System*—Wollaston.†III. Sys-
tem of
Wollaston.

Wollaston adopted a theory not unlike that propounded by Clarke. He says, "for a man to act virtuously, he must square his conduct according to the *truth of things*, or treat everything according to *its real character*, or *as it really is*."

Abercrombie considers the meaning both of Clarke and Wollaston to be obscure. Both systems, however, must be rejected, as they refer our primary impression of virtue to a relation perceived by *reason*; if the impression were obtained from reason, it could not be, as it is, universal.

IV. *Theory of Utility*—Hume.‡IV. Sys-
tem of
Hume.

According to Hume, we estimate the virtue of an action by its utility.

The following extracts will give a notion of his *Theory of Utility*. views:

"It seems so natural a thought to ascribe to their utility the praise which we bestow upon social vir-

* *Vide Note L, Appendix I.*

† *Vide Note M, Appendix I.*

‡ *Vide Note N, Appendix I.*

tues, that one would expect to meet with this principle everywhere in moral writings as the chief foundation of their reasoning or inquiry. In common life we may observe that the circumstance of utility is clearly appealed to, nor is it supposed that a greater eulogy can be given to any man than to display his usefulness to the public and enumerate the services he has performed to mankind and society. What praise even of an inanimate form, if the regularity and elegance of its parts destroys not its fitness for any useful purpose. And how satisfactory an apology for any disproportion or seeming deformity, if we can show the necessity of that particular construction for the use intended. A ship appears more beautiful to an artist or one moderately skilled in navigation, when its form is wide and swelling, than if it were framed with a precise geometrical regularity in contradiction to all the laws of mechanics."

Again—

“ It appears evident that the ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be accounted for by *reason*, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependence on the intellectual faculties.

“ Now, as virtue is an end, and is desirable on its own account, without fee or reward, merely for the immediate satisfaction which it conveys, it is requisite that there should be some sentiment which it touches; some internal taste or feeling or whatever you please to call it, which distinguishes moral good and evil, and which embraces the one and rejects the other.

“ Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of *reason* and *taste* are easily ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood; the latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The one discovers objects, as they really stand in nature, without addition or diminution; the other has a productive faculty: and gilding or staining all natural objects with the colors borrowed from internal sentiment, raises, in a manner, a new creation. Reason, being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the impulse received from appetite or inclination, by showing us the means of attaining happiness or avoiding misery. Taste, as it gives pleasure or pain, and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a motive to action, and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition. From circumstances and relations known or supposed, the former leads us to the discovery of the concealed and unknown. After all circumstances and relations are laid before us, the latter makes us feel from the whole a new sentiment of blame or approbation.”

An obvious objection to the system of utility is Criticism, that it may be applied to the effects of inanimate matter as correctly as to the deeds of a voluntary agent. To use the words of Dr. Smith, according to this theory, “ we have no other reason for praising a man, than that for which we commend a chest-of-drawers.” To obviate this difficulty, Hume was driven to a distinction, which, in fact, amounted to giving up the doctrine, namely, that the sense of utility must be combined with a feeling of approbation. This leads us back again to

the foundation on which this feeling of approbation rests, and at once recognises a principle distinct from the mere perception of utility.

V. System
of Hobbes.

Selfish
System.

V. *Selfish System*—Hobbes. *

According to the selfish system, man's fundamental principle of conduct is *a desire to promote his own gratification or interest.*

The most remarkable exponent of this theory in modern times, is Hobbes:

“ Whatever,” he says, “ is the object of any man's desire or appetite, that is it which he for his part calleth *good*, and the object of his hate or aversion, *evil*; for these words of *good* and *evil* and *contemptible* are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there being nothing *simply or absolutely* so, nor any common rule of good or evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves, but from the person of the man, where there is no commonwealth; or in a commonwealth from the person that representeth it.”

He derives *right* and *wrong* from the consideration of man in a state of nature. And this state of nature is, according to him, a state of mutual war. In this state no moral element exists.

“ To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent, that nothing can be unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no Law; where no Law, no Injustice. Force and Fraud are, in war, the two cardinal *virtues*. Justice and Injustice are none of the faculties, either of the body or the mind.”

* *Vide Note O, Appendix I.*

Again, “ The sovereign, whether he be a single person or an assembly, contains in himself the origin of all good and justice. No man can, without injustice, protest against his ordinances.”

Virtuous conduct, it is true, does impart gratification, and does promote the true interest of the agent; but this tendency is the effect, not the cause, and never can be considered as the principle which imparts to conduct its character of virtue; nor do we perform it, merely because it affords us gratification, or promotes our interest.

VI. *System of Utility combined with Divine Command*—Paley.* VI System of Paley.

Paley advocated a system of Utility in which he made private happiness the *motive*, and the will of God the *rule* of action. He was a decided opponent of the doctrine of a *moral sense*.† In describing virtue, he says :

“ Virtue is *the doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness*. According to which definition, ‘the good of mankind’ is the subject; the ‘will of God’ the rule; & ‘everlasting happiness’ the motive, of human virtue. Virtue has been divided by some into *benevolence, prudence, fortitude, and temperance*. *Benevolence* proposes good ends; *prudence* suggests the best means of attaining these ends; *fortitude* enables us to encounter the difficulties,

Paley on
virtue.

* *Vide Note P, Appendix I.*

† By *moral sense* was meant an *innate capacity* of moral judgment. The term *moral sense* was introduced by Shaftesbury (1671-1713), but Hutcheson (1649-1747) applied it systematically, and developed fully the doctrine it implies.

dangers, and discouragements which stand in our way in the pursuit of these ends; *temperance* repels and overcomes the passions that obstruct it.

“ The four CARDINAL virtues are, *prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice.*”

But the division of virtue to which we are in modern times most accustomed, is into duties: (i.) Towards *God*; as piety, reverence, resignation, gratitude. (ii.) Towards *other men* (or relative duties); as justice, charity, loyalty. (iii.) Towards *ourselves*; as chastity, sobriety, temperance, preservation of life, care of health, &c.

“ Although by the above definition it appears that the good of man is the subject, the will of God the rule, and everlasting happiness the motive and end of all virtue; yet may a man perform virtuous acts without having any one of these motives in his thoughts, just as a man may be a very good servant, without thinking at every moment of a regard to his master’s will, or of an express attention to his master’s interest: but then he must have served for a long time under the actual direction of these motives to bring it to this: in which service his merit and virtue consist.

“ Man is a bundle of habits. There are habits of industry, attention, vigilance; of indolence, fretfulness, idleness; in a word, there is not a quality or function, either of mind or body, which does not feel the influence of this great law of animated nature.”

The will of God, which is the rule of virtue, is made known to us, (a.) partly by *revelation*, and (b.) partly by what we discover of his designs from his works, or, as we term it, by the *light of nature.*

From this last source (*b.*), Paley thinks it may clearly be inferred that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures; consequently, actions which promote that will and wish, must be agreeable to him; and the contrary. The method, therefore, of ascertaining the will of God concerning any action by the light of nature is, to inquire into the *tendency of the action to promote or diminish general happiness*. Proceeding on these grounds, he arrives at the conclusion that *whatever is expedient, is right*; and that it is the *utility of any moral rule alone, which constitutes the obligation of it*. Paley allows that an action may be useful in an individual case, which is not right. To constitute it *right*, it is necessary that it shall be "*expedient on the whole, at the long run, in all its effects, collateral and remote, as well as in those which are immediate and direct*."

According to Abercrombie, the real objection to Criticism. Paley's doctrine lies in his rejection of the supreme authority of conscience, and in substituting for it a circuitous process of reasoning to be carried on by each individual, respecting the entire and ultimate expediency of actions.

Two objections may be urged against the application of such a theory in practice. *Two* objections.

(1.) If we suppose a man deliberating respecting an action, which he perceives would be eminently expedient and useful in an individual case, we may naturally ask, whether he is likely to arrive at a correct conclusion respecting the consequences of the action "*upon the whole, at the long run, in all its consequences, remote and collateral*."

1. Deliberation requires impartiality.

Men in general are apt to consider their own pains and pleasures before those of other men ; and this propensity must interfere with that impartiality which the system of utility requires.

2. Process
too com-
plex. (2.) Again, we may be allowed to doubt whether any human being can arrive at such an extensive knowledge, as this theory requires, of all the consequences of an action, remote and collateral. Such a knowledge must be regarded as beyond the reach of his limited faculties.

Objections to dependent systems. By adopting *any* system which rejects the supreme authority of conscience as an original part of our moral constitution :

1. They subject moral decisions to a reasoning process. (1.) We reduce every moral decision to what must primarily be a *process of reasoning*, in which, from the intricate calculation of consequences which necessarily arises, there can scarcely fail to be differences of opinion respecting the tendency of actions, instead of that absolute conviction which the subject so imperatively demands.

2. The good man decides from a sense of duty. (2.) Again, a conscientious man, in considering an action which involves a point of moral duty, *does not* enter upon any such calculation of consequences. He simply asks himself, *is it right?* and then decides, according to an impulse within, which he feels to be an ultimate element of his moral constitution.

3. Doc-
trine
of utility
hostile to (3.) The doctrine of utility cannot be reconciled with the principle of moral responsibility. For what we call vice and virtue, must resolve them-

selves into differences of opinion respecting what is most expedient in all its consequences remote and collateral. The decision being one of extreme difficulty, how can we ascribe moral guilt to a mere error in judgment respecting an ultimate good ?

(4.) The doctrine of utility is inconsistent with the fact that there are *two* classes of actions, in regard to which men's decisions are very differently governed. Some actions are (i.) merely *expedient*, others (ii.) are absolutely *right*.

(i.) In deciding respecting actions of the *first class*, a man carefully deliberates on their *tendencies*, that is their utility to himself or others whose welfare he has in view: and he reflects on what was the result of his conduct in similar cases, on former occasions.

Regarding actions to which a calculation of utility may properly be applied, remarkable differences of judgment are manifested by men equally endowed with high integrity and commanding talent. Thus the patriotic statesman feels that he must bring forward measures calculated to promote the good of his country; but the individual measures are founded upon expediency or utility; and the same measure will often be described as beneficial and necessary by some, which is characterised as injurious and needless by others; the advocates and the opponents being men of equal ability and honesty.

(ii.) In deciding respecting actions of the *second class*, a man enters into no calculations; he feels an *immediate impression* that a certain course is

moral responsibility.

4. It neglects distinction between expedient and right.

(i.) Expedient actions.

right, and a certain other, wrong, without the least regard to their tendencies. Every one is conscious of this difference, between acting from a perception of utility, and from a feeling of obligation or a sense of duty.

5. Correct notion of utility must be gained from experience.

(5.) Lastly, a correct idea of the utility of any action can be *derived only from experience.*

Hence, on the utilitarian hypothesis, the study of the principles of morality would consist of a series of observations or experiments, by which valid conclusions may be ascertained; it would be necessary for each individual either (a.) to rely upon others for his conclusions, or (b.) to make the requisite observations and experiments *himself.*

a. A man must rely upon others;

(a.) In the former case he could not fail to perceive the precarious nature of the basis on which he was receiving such important principles. He could not fail to observe, that, in other sciences, unsound and premature conclusions had been arrived at. How is he to be satisfied that in this all-important subject, errors have not also been committed?

b. Or upon himself.

(b.) To avoid such uncertainty, he may resolve on arriving at the requisite conclusions for himself. But here a difficulty occurs. Such investigations would require long time and anxious thought; but the period of action cannot be delayed; and action itself, as a rule, requires promptness and decision. The man who trusts to his own investigations must remain for a long time, perhaps always, in uncertainty as to the great moral principles which should govern his conduct.

The foundation of all dependent theories of morals is the impression that there is nothing right or wrong, just or unjust, in itself; but that our ideas of right and wrong, justice and injustice, arise either (i.) from *actual law*, or (ii.) *mutual compact*, or (iii.) from our view of *the tendencies of actions*, or (iv.) from the *will of God*.*

Foundation of dependent theories.

Immutability of moral distinctions.

By the *immutability of moral distinctions* is meant that there are certain actions which are immutably right, and which we are bound in duty to perform; and certain actions which are immutably wrong, apart from any other consideration whatever; and that an absolute conviction of this is fixed upon us in the conscience, independently of knowledge derived from *any other source* respecting the will or laws of the Almighty. This important distinction has been aptly expressed, thus:—Virtuous actions are not right because God has commanded them, but God has commanded them because they are right.

Upon our conviction of the existence of a moral principle in ourselves and others, is founded that *mutual confidence which keeps mankind together*. In order that the confidence should be complete, there is also required *an impression of uniformity*, or a conviction that the actions which we disapprove in others, will be condemned in us by the *unanimous decision of other men*.

Uniformity of moral impressions,

* The origin of right and wrong has been ascribed by some directly to the will of the Deity. According to this view there is nothing wrong which might not have been right, if God had so ordained it.

an intuitive belief. This *uniformity of moral feeling* actually exists, and must be ranked among our intuitive beliefs.

It cannot be ascribed directly to the will of God, nor can it arise from any source that may be influenced by such variable elements of man's nature, as judgment, taste, feeling, or interest.

Objections to this uniformity. In opposition to the belief in a uniformity of moral feeling, certain ethical writers have adduced such practices as the encouragement of theft in Sparta, and the exposure of the aged among certain tribes in India.

These objections answered. Such instances prove no diversity of moral feelings: but a difference of practice, arising from certain special exigencies, under the influence of which the primary moral feeling is, *for the time*, set aside.

It was not that in Sparta there was any absence of the usual moral feeling in regard to theft in the abstract,—but that the cultivation of habits of activity and enterprise, which arose from the practice, was considered as a national object of the highest importance, in a small state, surrounded by powerful enemies.

Just so, the individual man may be misled by passion or interest to do what his sober judgment condemns. In so doing, there is no want of the ordinary moral feeling which influences other men: but he has brought himself to violate this feeling, for purposes which he finds desirable; and then, probably, seeks to defend his own conduct to himself and others. He has a distinct perception of what is right, while he does what is wrong.

There are numerous facts which illustrate this principle :

(a.) Thus even robbers observe towards each other the laws of honour ; and the fidelity of smugglers towards their associates is notorious.

(b.) In some of the tribes in the South Seas, it was found that while they encouraged each other in pillaging strangers, theft was most severely punished among themselves.

(c.) Those who advocate slavery, rarely attempt a broad defence of the institution itself, but generally bring forward certain palliating circumstances, in order to show that slavery may be reconciled with the principles of humanity and justice. No attempt is ever made to prove, that it is consistent with these principles to tear human beings from their country and their kindred, and reduce them to bondage.

VII. *Theory of Sympathy*—Adam Smith.*

Dr. Adam Smith propounded an ingenious theory, termed *the theory of sympathy*.†

According to this theory, we do not immediately approve of certain actions, or disapprove of certain other actions, when we have become acquainted with the intention of the agent, and the consequences of what he has done. All these we might know thoroughly without a feeling of the slightest approbation or disapprobation. It is necessary, before

VII. System of A. Smith.

—
Theory of Sympathy.
(From Dr. Brown).

* *Vide Note Q, Appendix I.*

† Abercrombie seems to regard this theory more favorably than any of the others to which he refers. As it leaves untouched the disputed *origin* of our moral impressions, the previous criticisms do not affect it.

any moral sentiment arise, that the mind should go through another process, that by which we seem for the time to enter into the feelings of the agent, and of those to whom his action has relation in its consequences or intended consequences, beneficial or injurious. If, by a process of this kind, on considering all the circumstances in which the agent was placed, we feel a complete sympathy with the passions or calmer emotions that actuated him, and with the gratitude of him who was the object of the action, we approve of the action as right, and feel the merit of the agent; our sense of the propriety of the action depending on our sympathy with the agent; our sense of the merit of the agent on our sympathy with the object of the action. If our sympathies be of an opposite kind, we disapprove of the action itself as improper, that is to say, as unsuitable to the circumstances, and ascribe not merit but demerit to the agent. When we regard our own conduct, we, in some measure, reverse this process: we imagine others sympathising with us, and we sympathise with their sympathy. We consider how our conduct would appear to an impartial spectator. We approve of it, if it be that of which we feel that he would approve; we disapprove of it, if it be that which we feel by the experience of our own former emotions,—when we have ourselves, in similar circumstances, estimated the actions of others,—would excite his disapprobation. We are able to form a judgment as to our own conduct, because we have previously judged of the moral conduct of others, that is to say, have previously sympathised with the feelings of others.

This system does not supply a fundamental rule of Criticism. of right and wrong. It applies only to the application of a principle, not to the origin of it. Our sympathy can never be supposed to constitute an action right or wrong; but it enables us to *apply to individual cases* a principle of right and wrong *derived from another source*; and to clear our judgment in doing so, from the influence of those selfish feelings which are apt to mislead us when we apply the principle directly to ourselves.

In estimating our own conduct, we employ those conclusions which we have made with regard to the conduct of others, or we imagine others employing them, and consider how our conduct would appear to an impartial observer.

The process by which we view an action, or a Decision course of conduct, in another, and then apply the decision to ourselves, is a most important one. When the power of moral judgment is obscured, in regard to our own conduct, by self-love or vicious habits, correct judgment is still often preserved respecting the actions of others. It is thus that men are led on by interest or passion into courses of action, which, if viewed dispassionately, they would not defend even in themselves; and which, when viewed in others, they promptly condemn.

OFFICE OF REASON.

We must distinguish carefully between the Office of *fundamental principle*, from which actions derive Reason. their character of right and wrong, and the *conclusions arrived at by reason* when it judges of the tendencies of actions.

1. When *expediency* is involved.

2. When the *affections* are concerned.

3. Where it is a case of *duty*.

4. When duties conflict.

5. When peculiar

1. In regard to *actions which do not involve any feeling of moral duty*, the office of reason is to judge of the expediency of such actions.

2. In regard to the *affections*, a process of reason is often necessary, not only respecting the best mode of exercising them, but also, in many cases, to decide whether we shall exercise them at all.

Thus we may feel pity for an unworthy individual, but consider it our duty to resist the affection, and reserve our aid for some one more deserving.

3. In cases where a feeling of moral duty is involved, reason may still be necessary for enabling us to adapt our means to the end in view. When anxious to promote the welfare of others, or to perform some important duty, the aid of reason may be necessary for the proper accomplishment of our object.

Conscience, in such cases, produces the *intention*; and *Reason* suggests the *means*: these, however, do not always harmonize. Thus a man may be sound in his intentions, who errs in judgment respecting the means of carrying them into effect. In such cases we attach our feeling of approbation to the intention only. We expect such a man to acquire wisdom from experience.

4. An exercise of reason is required (a.) in cases where one duty appears to interfere with another; (b.) likewise in judging in particular instances, whether any rule of duty is concerned, or whether we may act simply with a view to expediency.

5. Reason is concerned in certain cases where a modification of moral feeling arises from the

Respective functions of *Conscience* and *Reason* in cases of duty (3).

circumstances in which the individual is placed. Thus the life of another may be taken away by an individual (i.) under the impulse of revenge; or (ii.) in self-defence; or (iii.) by a judge in the discharge of his duty. The moral feeling in each of these cases is different.

The above remarks may be thus summarised.

Our *impression of right and wrong* is conveyed by a principle in the mind entirely distinct from a simple exercise of reason, and the *standard of moral rectitude* derived from this source is, in its own nature, fixed and immutable. But there are cases in which an exercise of reason may be employed, in referring particular actions to this standard, or trying them by means of it. Such a mental process, however, is only to be regarded as a *test* applied to individual instances, and must not be confounded with the *standard* to which it is the office of this test to refer them.

Right conduct *does* contribute to general utility and individual advantage: but these results do not constitute it *right*.

Rightness is founded upon the *immutable principle of moral rectitude*: it is perceived by *conscience*, and by the operation of conscience we pronounce an action to be right without any reference to its consequences, either to ourselves or others.

PART IV.

THE MORAL RELATION SUBSISTING BETWEEN
MAN AND THE DEITY.

Duties
man owes
to God.

I. Sense
of the
divine
presence.

When we view man in relation to the Deity, the duties to be considered refer chiefly to *purity* and *devotion*. They may be referred to the following heads :

I. There ought to be an habitual effort to cultivate a sense of the divine presence, and an habitual desire to have the whole moral condition regulated by this impression.

The state of mind which is under the influence of the divine presence may be considered under *two relations*:

(i.) The one referring directly to God.

This implies an effort to have every desire, thought, and imagination of the heart regulated by a sense of the presence and purity of God, and in conformity to his will.

(ii.) The other to our fellow-men.

This includes the cultivation of feelings of *kindness* and *benevolence* towards all men; the love of *justice*, the love of *truth*, the *forgiveness of injuries*, and the *repression of selfishness*.

From these two mental conditions must spring a character distinguished alike by (a.) piety towards God, and (b.) high integrity, benevolence, and active usefulness towards men.

II. Sub-
mission.

II. There ought to be a dutiful submission to the appointments of Providence, as part of a great system which is regulated by infinite wisdom.

III. There ought to be a sense of moral imperfection and guilt, and a feeling of humility in consequence.

This must be a prominent feeling in every one who views his own conduct, and his mental emotions in reference to the purity of God.

IV. There ought to be a profound sense of gratitude and love towards the Deity as the giver of all good; as our daily preserver and benefactor.

Faith secures Purity and Devotion.

We will now investigate the means by which purity and devotion may be maintained as the regulating principles of the whole character.

This may be effected in two ways, either (i.) by an influence directly from God, or (ii.) by a process of the mind itself termed Faith.

The discussion of the first of these belongs to theology; the explanation of the latter may be regarded as within the province of ethics.

Faith is a mental process by which an habitual influence of a peculiar kind is produced upon the characterised whole character.

It is composed of (1) *reason*, (2) *attention*, and (3) *a modification of conception*. Analysed.

(1.) The province of *reason* is to examine the truth of the statements or doctrines which are proposed to the mind as calculated to act upon its moral feelings.

(2.) It is the office of *attention* (aided by reason) to direct the mind assiduously to the requisite truths, so as fully to perceive their relations and tendencies.

(3.) Conception. (3.) By the last process (which is analogous to conception), they are placed before us in such a manner as to give them real and present existence.

General remarks. By these means, truths relating to things for which we have not the evidence of our senses, or referring to events which are future, but fully expected to happen, are kept before the mind, and influence the moral feelings and the character in the same manner as if the facts believed were actually seen, or the events expected were taking place in our view.

Neglect of (1) produces ; When the judgment* is not properly exercised, one of the two following results will ensue :

(a.) Enthusiasm, (a.) When the impression which is allowed to influence the mind has not been received by the judgment upon due examination and adequate evidence of its truth, *enthusiasm*, not faith, is the result.

(b.) Hasty unbelief. (b.) An opposite error consists in treating real and important truths as if they were visions of the imagination, dismissing them without examination of the evidence on which they are founded.

Source of above errors. These two errors may be traced to the same source.

In *enthusiasm*, a fiction of the imagination is received and depended upon as truth.

In *hasty unbelief*, some prejudice or wrong impression is acted upon, and the truth is consequently rejected.

* Abercrombie regards the terms *judgment* and *reason* as synonymous.

In both these cases the misapplication of the reasoning powers is the same. It consists in *proceeding upon a mere impression without exercising the judgment on the question of its evidence*, or on the facts and considerations which are opposed to it.

When a truth has fully received the sanction of the judgment, the second office of faith is, by *Attention and Conception*, to keep it habitually before the mind, so that it may produce its proper influence upon the character.

The sound exercise of that mental condition which we call Faith, consists, therefore, (i.) in the reception of certain truths by the judgment; (ii.) in the proper direction of the attention to their moral tendencies; and (iii.) in the habitual influence of such truths upon the feelings and the conduct.

The truths which it is the object of Faith to bring before us, are as follows:

1. There exists a moral Governor of the universe, a Being of infinite perfections, and infinite purity.

From the works of nature, we trace his operation as the great First Cause, and infer his boundless power and wisdom, and his independent existence. The impression of his moral attributes he has fixed upon our moral perceptions. By the aid of conscience, and a simple process of reason, we perceive him to be a Being of infinite holiness, and of unerring truth and justice.

2. We have a firm conviction that God is everywhere present; that he is the witness, not omnipresent.

only of our conduct, but of the thoughts and imaginations of the heart; and that from these our moral state is estimated by him.

3. There is a future state.

3. This world is preparatory to another state of being, a state of moral retribution, when God will be disclosed in all his attributes as a moral Governor.

HARMONY OF THE MORAL FEELINGS.

Emotions relate to,

Our moral feelings may be divided into *three* classes :

1. Our-selves.

1st.—Those which refer to objects of desire, the attainment of which brings satisfaction to *ourselves*.

2. Others.

2nd.—Those which refer to our *fellow-men*.

3. God.

3rd.—Those which refer to the *Deity*.

To each of these classes, there correspond certain duties. On the due performance of these duties, the harmony of our moral feelings depends.

Duties

The following scale of duties will enable us to furnish rules for securing the requisite harmony :

(i.) To God.

(i.) The most important duties are those which man owes to *God*.

(ii.) To Man ;

(ii.) Next come the duties which he owes to his *fellow-men*:

Justice, Veracity,

(a.) The most important are those which relate to Justice and Veracity.

Family duties,

(b.) Then come the Domestic duties, such as the duties of children to their parents, and parents to their children.

Friendship, Patriotism.

(c.) Then follow the duties of Friendship, Benevolence, and Patriotism.

(d.) After these come the duties which refer to the ordinary avocations of life, such as the pursuits of business, &c.

(iii.) Lastly, come the duties which a man owes to himself, such for instance, as the acquisition of knowledge, the indulgence in a due amount of recreation, &c., &c.

A due regard must be paid to each of these duties according to their rank in the above scale. To begin with the lowest, a man will act unworthily of his moral nature if he devotes himself exclusively to *recreation* or *amusement*. Such a man lives only for the present life.

Again the details of *business*, however important in themselves, must not be allowed entirely to engross the attention.

Even *benevolent* and *useful* pursuits may be indulged in to excess. This will happen when they withdraw our attention from the duties which we owe to our families and ourselves. Finally, no pursuits of any kind must interfere with a man's highest obligations, with the *duties which he owes to God*. At the same time, attention even to these duties must not be allowed to estrange the mind from the responsibilities of *active life*.

APPENDIX I.
NOTES.

LIST OF NOTES.

- A. *A priori* Arguments;
 - 1. For existence of Deity. (Stewart.)
 - 2. For a Future Life. (Butler.)
- B. 1. Appetites characterised. (Stewart.)
 - 2. Appetites and Desires distinguished. (Stewart.)
 - 3. Reid's classification of Active Principles.
- C. Secondary Desires (Stewart.)
- D. Emulation and Envy distinguished. (Butler.)
- E. 1. Appetites not necessarily selfish. (Reid.)
 - 2. The Natural Desires not necessarily selfish. (Reid.)
- F. Aristotle's distinction between Distributive and Corrective Justice.
- G. On Promises. (Whewell.)
- H. Will and Volition. (Reid.)
- I. On Right and Wrong in the act, and in the agent according to the Utilitarian System. (Paley.)
- K. Life and Opinions of Mandeville.
- L. Life of Dr. Samuel Clarke.
- M. Life of Wollaston.
- N. Life of Hume.
- O. Life of Hobbes.
- P. Life of Paley.
- Q. Life of Adam Smith.

NOTE A.—*Page 5.*1. *A Priori* ARGUMENT FOR THE DEITY.

This argument has been enforced with singular ingenuity by Dr. Clarke, whose particular manner of stating it seems to have been suggested to him by the following passage in Newton's *Principia*:* “Æternus est et infinitus, omnipotens et omnisciens; id est, durat ab æterno in æternum, et adest ab infinito in infinitum. Non est æternitas et infinitas, sed æternus et infinitus; non est duratio et spatium, sed durat et adest. Durat semper, et adest ubique; et existendo semper et ubique, durationem et spatium constituit.” Proceeding on the same principles, Dr. Clarke argues, that “space and time are only abstract conceptions of an immensity and eternity, which force themselves into our belief; and, as immensity and eternity are not substances, they must be the attributes of a Being who is necessarily immense and eternal.”

2. *A Priori* ARGUMENT FOR A FUTURE LIFE.

The *à priori* argument for a Future Life will be found drawn out at length in the first part of Butler's *Analogy*.

The following is an outline of the argument:

Our present experience suggests to us the belief that we shall continue to live on in a Future State; for

I. The changes which we have undergone in our birth and in our growth from infancy, are as great as any which death can bring upon us.

II. There is an *à priori* probability that our present powers of thought and action will be continued to us after death, unless we have some *positive* reason given us for thinking that death will be the destruction of these living powers. If there is an idea that death will be the destruction of living powers, that idea must arise either (i.) from the *reason of the thing*, or (ii.) from the *analogy of Nature*.

* *Newton. Princ. Scholium Generale.* It is not easy to give the full force of this passage in English: Clarke's argument represents its meaning well enough.

(i.) It does not arise from the *reason of the thing*; for we do not know what death is; we only know some of its phenomena and effects, as the dissolution of skin, bones, &c., and all these in nowise imply the *destruction* of any living powers. Again we do not know on what the existence of our living powers depends; for we see them suspended—in sleep, for example, or in a swoon—and still not extinguished.

(ii.) Neither does it arise from the *analogy of Nature*; for death removes all sensible proof, and precludes us, consequently, from tracing out any analogy which would warrant us in inferring their destruction. But while it destroys the sensible proof of the existence of these living powers, which we had before their death, it surely cannot give us reason to believe that by death they are destroyed.

III. All presumption of death being the destruction of living powers, must go on the idea of their *discreptibility* (*i. e.* capability of separation). But as consciousness is single and indivisible, so is that in which consciousness resides, and therefore it is *indiscreptible*. But as for our bodies, they are mere matter; they are no part of ourselves; and it is as easy to conceive we may exist apart from our bodies as in them.

IV. Human creatures exist in two states: *first*, in a state of sensation; and *secondly*, in a state of reflection. Now death destroys existence as far as regards the former state; but there is no presumption that it has the same effect on our state of reflection.

NOTE B.—*Page 12.*

1. APPETITES CHARACTERISED.

(1.) They take their rise from the body, and are common to us with the brutes.

(2.) They are not constant, but occasional.

(3.) They are accompanied with an uneasy sensation, which is strong or weak in proportion to the strength or weakness of the appetite.

Beside our natural appetites, we have many *acquired* ones. Such are, an appetite for tobacco, for opium, and for intoxicating liquors.—(*Stewart.*)

2. APPETITES AND DESIRES DISTINGUISHED.

The desires *proper* are distinguished from the appetites by the following circumstances :

- (1.) They do not take their rise from the body.
- (2.) They do not operate periodically, after certain intervals; and they do not cease upon the attainment of a particular object.—(*Stewart.*)

3. CLASSIFICATION OF ACTIVE PRINCIPLES.

The division of the active principles of our nature given by Abercrombie is, in the main, the same as that given by Reid and Stewart, *viz.*, (i.) Appetites, (ii.) Desires, (iii.) Affections, (iv.) Self-love, and (v.) the Moral Faculty.

Reid divides the principles of action into *three* classes :

1st.—*Mechanical* principles, *viz.*, (i.) Habit, and (ii.) Instinct. These produce their effect without any will or intention on our part.

2nd.—*Animal* principles, *viz.*, (i.) Appetites, (ii.) Desires, and (iii.) Affections. These require intention and will in their operation, but not judgment.

Under the title of *Affections*, Reid comprehended all those active principles whose direct and ultimate object is the communication of joy or pain to our fellow-creatures. According to this definition, resentment, revenge, hatred are affections, as well as gratitude or pity.

3rd.—*Rational* principles, *viz.*, (i.) Self-love and (ii.) Conscience. These are the leading and governing principles to which all our animal principles are subordinate, and to which they ought to be subject. They can have no existence in beings not endowed with reason, and, in all their exertions, require not only intention and will, but judgment or reason.

NOTE C.—*Page 12.*

SECONDARY DESIRES.

As we have acquired appetites, so also we have acquired or secondary desires. Whatever conduces to the attainment of

Reid's division of the principles of action.

any object of natural desire, is itself desired on account of its subserviency to this end; and frequently comes, in process of time, to acquire, in our estimation, an intrinsic value. It is thus that wealth becomes, with many, an ultimate object of pursuit; although it is undoubtedly valued, at first, merely as the means of attaining other objects. In like manner, men are led to desire dress, equipage, retinue, furniture, on account of the estimation in which they are supposed to be held by the public. The origin of these desires is easily explicable, on the principle of Association.—(*Stewart.*)

NOTE D.—*Page 13.*

EMULATION AND ENVY DISTINGUISHED.

The distinction between these two principles of action is well stated by Butler: “Emulation is merely the desire of superiority over others with whom we compare ourselves. To desire the attainment of this superiority, by the particular means of others being brought down below our own level, is the distinct notion of Envy. From whence it is easy to see, that the real end which the natural passion Emulation, and which the unlawful one, Envy, aims at, is exactly the same; and consequently, that to do mischief is not the end of Envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain its end.”

NOTE E.—*Page 15.*

1. APPETITES NOT NECESSARILY SELFISH.

Appetites, considered in themselves, are neither social principles of action, nor selfish. They cannot be called social, because they imply no concern for the good of others. Nor can they justly be called selfish, though they be commonly referred to that class. An appetite draws us to a certain object, without regard to its being good for us, or ill. There is no self-love implied in it any more than benevolence.

We see that, in many cases, appetite may lead a man to what he knows will be to his hurt. It is evident that in every case of this kind, self-love is sacrificed to appetite.—(*Reid.*)

2. NATURAL* DESIRES NOT SELFISH.

The *natural desires* cannot, with propriety, be called *selfish principles*, though they have commonly been accounted such. When power is desired for its own sake, and not as the means in order to obtain something else, this desire is neither selfish nor social. When a man desires power as the means of doing good to others, this is benevolence. When he desires it only as the means of promoting his own good, this is self-love. But when he desires it for its own sake, this only can properly be called the desire of power; and it implies neither self-love nor benevolence. The same thing may be applied to the desires of esteem and of knowledge.—(*Reid.*)

NOTE F.—*Page 18.*

DISTRIBUTIVE AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE.

The division of justice into *distributive* and *corrective* is due to Aristotle.

According to Aristotle, justice was divided into (i.) *Universal* and (ii.) *Particular*.

I. *Universal* justice is the habit of obedience to the fixed principles of moral rectitude when considered relatively to others.

II. *Particular* justice is of two kinds : (i.) *distributive* and (ii.) *corrective*.

(i.) *Distributive* justice consists in the distribution of property, honours, &c., in the state, according to the merits of each citizen.

(ii.) *Corrective* justice deals with transactions between man and man. It takes no account of individual worth.†

* The Desires included by Reid under this head are the Desire of power, the Desire of esteem, and the Desire of knowledge.

† Aristotle mentions a third kind of particular justice, which he terms *Commutative Justice*.

This kind of justice regulates the exchange of wealth: the law being, that the value of a product varies directly as the amount of labour that has been expended in producing it.


Transactions being of two kinds, either (a.) voluntary or (b.) involuntary; corrective justice is sub-divided into two parts corresponding to these two classes of transactions :

(a.) *Voluntary* transactions are selling, buying, lending, pledging, borrowing, &c.

(b.) *Involuntary* transactions are such as theft, poisoning, assassination, and perjury, which are secret; and others accompanied with violence, as assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery, &c.

SCHEME.

JUSTICE.



NOTE G.—*Page 24.*

ON PROMISES.

The Duty of performing Promises is an extension of the Obligation of performing Contracts. *A Contract is a Promise, sanctioned by the formalities which the law prescribes, as necessary to make it valid.* It is a Duty to perform Contracts, as well as a legal Obligation; but the Duty is not limited by the formalities which limit the legal Obligation. The legal obliga-

tion depends upon the external form, as well as the intention; but the Duty depends upon the intention and mutual understanding alone; and therefore the duty of performing promises must exist, wherever the mutual understanding of the Promiser and Promisee existed.

The Duties connected with Truth, are those which result from the Principle of Truth, *viz.*, *that we must conform to the universal understanding among men which the use of language implies.*

Every mode of conveying a false belief is prohibited by this Principle of Truth. This especially applies when we convey a belief of our own intention in a matter affecting him whom we address, that is, when we make a Promise. We are bound by the Duty of Truth to *promise only what we intend to perform.*

But if I have promised what I intended to perform, and afterwards change my intention, does it cease to be my Duty to perform my Promise? It is plain that it does not. To break my promise is to break the understanding between the Promisee and me. If a promise were capable of arbitrary revocation by the Promiser, it would establish no common understanding, and could be of no use in enabling the Promisee to regulate his actions. At the time I make the Promise I have the power of determining my future actions, by retaining my present intention. The engagement I make is, that I will retain it; and this the Promisee must be able to reckon upon, in order that the Promise may mean anything.

It follows from this, also, that Promises are to be performed *in the sense in which they were made and received, by the mutual understanding of the two parties, at the time.*

Principle of Truth.

Duty of performing promises.

Can Promiser change his intention?

Sense in which Promises must be performed.

NOTE H.—Page 34.

WILL AND VOLITION.

Volition signifies the *act* of willing and determining. *Will* is put indifferently to signify either the *power* of willing, or the *act*.

The term *Will* has very often a more extensive meaning, which must be carefully distinguished from that now given. In the general division of our faculties into *Understanding* and *Will*, our passions, appetites, and affections are comprehended under the *Will*; and so it is made to signify not only our determination to act, or not to act, but every motive and incitement to action.—(*Reid.*)

NOTE I.—*Page* 49.

ON RIGHT AND WRONG IN UTILITARIANISM.

In the utilitarian system, “Actions in the abstract are right or wrong, according to their *tendency*; the agent is virtuous or vicious, according to his *design*. Thus, if the question be, Whether relieving common beggars be right or wrong? we inquire into the *tendency* of such a conduct to the public advantage or inconvenience. If the question be, Whether a man remarkable for this sort of bounty is to be esteemed virtuous for that reason? we inquire into his *design* whether his liberality sprang from charity or from ostentation?”—(*Paley.*)

NOTE K.—*Page* 51.

LIFE OF MANDEVILLE.

MANDEVILLE, BERNARD DE, was born at Dort, in Holland, about the year 1670. He was brought up to the profession of medicine, and completed his studies and took the degree of Doctor of Medicine in Holland. He afterwards came over to England to practise his profession in London. In 1714, Mandeville published a short poem, called ‘The Grumbling Hive, or Knaves turned Honest,’ to which he afterwards added long explanatory notes, and then published the whole under the new title of ‘The Fable of the Bees.’ This work

exposed its author to much obloquy, and, besides meeting with many answers and attacks, was denounced as injurious to morality in a presentment of the Middlesex grand jury, in July, 1723. In 1728 he published a second part of the 'Fable of the Bees,' in order to illustrate more fully his original scheme. In 1720 he published a work called 'Free Thoughts on Religion'; and in a few years after, another, under the title of 'An Inquiry into the Origin of Honour, and Usefulness of Christianity in War.' He died on 21st January, 1733.

In the 'Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices Public Benefits,' it is Mandeville's object to show that national greatness depends on the prevalence of fraud and luxury; and for this purpose he supposes a "vast hive of bees," possessing in all respects institutions similar to those of men; he details the various frauds, similar to those among men, practised by bees one upon another in various professions; he shows how the wealth accumulated by means of these frauds is turned, through luxurious habits, to the good of others, who again practise their frauds on the wealthy; and having already assumed that wealth cannot be gotten without fraud, and cannot exist without luxury, he assumes further, that wealth is the only cause and criterion of national greatness. His hive of bees having thus become wealthy and great, he afterwards supposes a mutual jealousy of frauds to arise, and fraud to be by common consent dismissed; and he again assumes that wealth and luxury immediately disappear, and that the greatness of the society is gone.

In a chapter entitled 'An Inquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue,' Mandeville contends that virtue and vice, and the feelings of moral approbation and disapprobation, have been created in men by their several governments, for the purpose of maintaining society and preserving their own power.

NOTE L.—*Page 53.*

LIFE OF DR. SAMUEL CLARKE.

CLARKE, DR. SAMUEL, was born at Norwich, on 11th of October, 1675. His father, who had held the highest offices

in that city, and was in comfortable circumstances, determined to afford him the advantages of a liberal education, and accordingly sent him in due time (1691) to Caius College, Cambridge, where, amid the various objects of academic interest, young Clarke evinced a decided preference for Theology. Soon after taking his degree, he was actively engaged in introducing into the academic course of study, first, the philosophy of Descartes in its best form, and next the philosophy of Newton, immediately after its first publication. In 1704 he was appointed to preach the Boylean Lecture, when he chose for his subject 'The Being and Attributes of God.' The satisfaction which he gave on this occasion led to his re-election the following year, when he read a series of lectures on the evidences of natural and revealed religion. These lectures were afterwards expanded into the form of treatises. The publication of these treatises obtained for him European renown as a Christian philosopher, and a more substantial reward followed in the preferments which were liberally offered to him in his own Church. Among his multifarious engagements, he found time for the culture of physical science, and published a translation of Sir Isaac Newton's Latin Treatise on Optics, for which that philosopher gave him a present of £500, with the still more valuable addition of his private friendship. He died on 7th May, 1729. His aim throughout his moral speculations was to controvert the principles of Hobbes.

NOTE M.—*Page 53.*

LIFE OF WILLIAM WOLLASTON.

WOLLASTON, WILLIAM, an eminent moralist and theologian, who was educated for the Church, but having ample means left him by a rich relation, devoted himself to literature. His principal work is 'The Religion of Nature Delineated.'

Born in Staffordshire, 1659; died, 1724.

NOTE N.—*Page* 53.

LIFE OF DAVID HUME.

HUME, DAVID, was born at Edinburgh, 26th April, 1711; the youngest child of a poor laird of good blood. He was an orphan before his education was completed. His guardians first thought of the profession of law, but, owing to his repugnance, he was absolved from that career, and was placed in a Bristol counting-house, where he did not remain long. On coming of age he found himself in possession of a small property, too small for honorable subsistence in England, but large enough for France, and to Rheims he went; from thence to La Flèche, where the Jesuits' College and Library were great attractions to the studious youth; and there he passed several years in solitary study.

His 'Treatise on Human Nature,' which appeared in 1737, was announced as an attempt to introduce the experimental method into reasonings on Moral Science.

In 1741, appeared the first part of his 'Essays'; and in 1747, he accompanied General St. Clair, as secretary, in the embassy to Vienna and Turin. In 1752, he published his 'Political Discourses' and the 'Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.' The appointment of Librarian to the Faculty of Advocates in Edinburgh—the salary of which he generously gave to the poor poet Blacklock—placed at his disposal a fine collection of books; and this suggested the undertaking which has long been held as his greatest title to fame—the 'History of England,' the first volume of which appeared in 1754.

Hume died in 1776. Adam Smith in writing of him says: "Upon the whole, I have always considered him, both during his life-time and since his death, as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit."

NOTE O.—*Page* 56.

LIFE OF THOMAS HOBBES.

HOBBES, THOMAS, was born at Malmesbury, in Wiltshire, on the 5th April, 1588, and was the son of a clergyman of

that town. At the age of fifteen he was sent to Magdalen Hall, Oxford ; and after he had gone through the usual university course, he became in 1608 private tutor in the family of Lord Hardwicke, soon afterwards created Earl of Devonshire. In 1610, he went abroad with his pupil, Lord Cavendish, and made the tour of France and Italy. After his return he mixed much, chiefly through the assistance of his patron, the Earl of Devonshire, with the men most distinguished at that time for learning, as well as with others conspicuous by their high station. He enjoyed the familiar friendship of Bacon, who is said to have been assisted by Hobbes in the translation of some of his works into Latin, and was an intimate associate also of Lord Herbert of Cherbury, and of Ben Jonson. Ben Jonson revised for Hobbes his first work, the translation of Thucydides.

This translation was published in 1628. His patron, the Earl of Devonshire, had died two years before ; and the son, Hobbes's pupil, died in the year in which this translation was published. He was so much affected by this loss, that he gladly seized an opportunity of going abroad with the son of Sir Gervase Clifton, with whom he remained some time in France. He returned in 1631, at the instance of the Dowager Countess of Devonshire, to undertake the education of the young Earl, who was then only thirteen. In 1634, he went with his new pupil first to Paris, where he enjoyed the friendship of Mersenne, and pursued the study of natural philosophy ; afterwards to Italy, where he became known to Galileo. He returned to England in 1637. Shortly after the meeting of the Long Parliament (November, 1640), he again went to Paris, where in 1642 he printed privately the 'De Cive.' About this time he became acquainted with Descartes and Gassendi.

In 1647, Hobbes was appointed mathematical tutor to the Prince of Wales, afterwards Charles II. ; and he so won the affection of the Prince, that though, after the publication of the 'Leviathan,' Charles, yielding to the opinions of the clergy, forbade him his presence, he yet always spoke of him in terms of the greatest kindness, and when he had been restored to his throne (1660), unasked, presented him with a pension (£100 a year).

Hobbes's two small Treatises, entitled 'Human Nature' and 'De Corpore Politico,' were published in London in 1650. In 1651, he completed in Paris, and published in London,

the 'Leviathan.' As this work gave offence to the Catholic clergy of Paris, Hobbes was forced to return to England, where he remained till his death in 1679.

The 'Leviathan' and the 'De Cive' were censured by Parliament in 1666.

NOTE P.—*Page 57.*

LIFE OF DR. WILLIAM PALEY.

PALEY, WILLIAM, D. D., was born in 1743, at Peterborough, Northamptonshire. At the age of sixteen he entered Christ's College, Cambridge. The first two years of his university residence were devoted to pleasure and dissipation. At the end of this time, however, he resolved to abandon his idle practices, and enter on a course of severe study. In 1766, he became a fellow of the College, and soon after colleague to Dr. Law in his public lectures on Moral and Political Philosophy, as well as on the New Testament. As a College lecturer and a preacher, he was greatly admired for his sound sense, and for his extraordinary skill in simplifying the most abstruse and difficult subjects. In 1782, he obtained the archdeaconry of Carlisle. In 1785, his 'Elements of Moral and Political Philosophy' appeared. It was almost immediately adopted as a text book in Cambridge. His other principal works are the 'Horæ Paulinæ,' 'The Evidences of Christianity,' and a 'Treatise on Natural Theology.' He died in 1805. Mackintosh says "his style is as near perfection in its kind as any in our language."

NOTE Q.—*Page 65.*

LIFE OF ADAM SMITH.

SMITH, ADAM, LL. D., was born at Kirkaldy, in Fifeshire, on 5th June, 1723. In 1737, he entered the University of Glas-

gow, where he studied under Hutcheson. From Glasgow he passed to Balliol College, Oxford, returning to Edinburgh in 1748. In 1751, he obtained the chair of Logic in the University of Glasgow, and in the subsequent year, he was nominated to the professorship of Moral Philosophy. In 1759, he published his 'Theory of Moral Sentiments.' Resigning his chair in 1763, he accompanied the young Duke of Buccleuch to the Continent. In Paris he met his old companion Hume, and became acquainted with Turgot and Quesnay. On his return to Scotland in 1766, he retired to his native town, and after ten years, he produced his celebrated work, on the 'Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.'

This procured him the appointment of Commissioner of Customs in Scotland. In 1778, he fixed his residence in Edinburgh, where he died on 8th July, 1790. Besides his great works, the 'Theory of the Moral Sentiments' and the 'Wealth of Nations,' he left a few philosophical Essays, among which is a précis of the early History of Astronomy.

APPENDIX II.
DISSERTATIONS.

LIST OF DISSERTATIONS.

- A. Morality and Moral Philosophy defined. (Sydney Smith.)
- B. On the term Motive. (Fleming, Whewell.)
- C. On the terms Right, Duty, and Obligation. (Whewell.)
- D. Paley's Classification of Duties.
- E. 1. Whewell on the *Offices* of Conscience.
[Brief notice of Whewell.]
2. Butler on the *Authority* of Conscience.
[Brief notice of Butler.]
3. Plato's view of human nature.
[Brief notice of Plato.]
- F. Opinions of the Ancients concerning the Sovereign Good. (Chiefly from Stewart.)
Epicureans.—Life of Epicurus.
Stoics.—Life of Zeno.
Peripatetics.—Life of Aristotle.
- G. On the general definition of Virtue. (Stewart.)
- H. Of an ambiguity in the words Right and Wrong, Virtue and Vice. (Stewart.)
[Brief notice of Stewart, with an outline of his ethical system.]

A.

MORALITY AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

Morality or Ethics is the science which treats of actions as right or wrong, and which teaches the duties of life. The latter part, *viz.*, that referring to duties, has been termed Deontology.

Moral Philosophy, as used by Adam Smith, Reid, Stewart, and others, comprehends all the intellectual, active, and moral faculties of man; the laws by which they are governed; the limits by which they are controlled; and the means by which they may be improved: it aims at discovering the system of human action most agreeable to the intentions of the Deity, and most conducive to the happiness of man.

B.

ON THE TERM MOTIVE.

The connotation of the term *motive* (like that of many other terms in mental and moral science) is not precisely fixed. The following remarks may throw some light upon its different meanings :

“ In order to determine precisely the use of the term *motive*, Fleming,
See of Phil. we must distinguish between the three following elements: (i.) the *external object*, (ii.) the *internal principle*, and (iii.) the *state or affection of mind* resulting from the one being addressed to the other.

“ For example, *bread or food* of any kind is the external object which is adapted to an internal principle called *appetite*, and *hunger* or the desire for food is the internal feeling, which is excited by the presentment of the external object to the internal principle.

“ In popular language, the term motive might be applied to any one of these three. But, strictly speaking, the feeling of hunger was the motive; it was that, in the preceding state of mind, which disposed or inclined the agent to act in one way rather than in any other. The same may be said of motives of every kind. In every case there may be observed the

external object, the internal principle, and the resultant state or affection of mind ; and the term motive may be applied, separately and successively, to any one of them ; but, speaking strictly, it should be applied to the terminating state or affection of mind which arises from a principle of human nature having been addressed by an object adapted to it ; because, it is this state or affection of mind which prompts to action."

The following is Dr. Whewell's account of motives :

" The springs of action (*vide* p. 26) are the motive powers of man's conscious nature, and might hence be called *motives*. They first put man in motion ; that is, in the state of internal motion which leads to intention and will. But in common language, the term *motive* is rather used to designate the *special object* of the intention than the general desire which impels us to intend. When a man labours hard for gain, his spring of action being the desire of having, his *motive* is to get money. But he may do the same thing, his motive being to support his family, and then his spring of action is his family affections."

C.

ON THE TERMS RIGHT, DUTY, AND OBLIGATION.

" The word *right* has a very different meaning, according as it is applied, to actions or to persons. A *right* action is an action agreeable to our duty. But when we speak of the *rights of men*, the word has a very different, and a more artificial meaning. It is a term of art in law, and signifies all that a man may lawfully do, all that he may lawfully possess and use, and all that he may lawfully claim of any other person."

The terms *duty* and *obligation* are often used as synonymous ; but for scientific purposes, it may be convenient to distinguish between them. The following distinction is drawn by Dr. Whewell in his Elements of Morality :

" To a *Right*, on one side, corresponds an *Obligation* on the other. If a man has a *Right* to my horse, I have an *Obligation* to let him have it. If a man has a *Right* to the fruit of a certain tree, all other persons are under an *Obligation* to abstain from appropriating it. Men are *obliged* to respect each other's Rights.

"My *Obligation* is to give another man his Right; my *Duty* is to do what is *right*. Hence *Duty* is a wider term than *Obligation*; just as *right*, the adjective, is wider than *Right* the substantive.

"Duty has no correlative, as Obligation has the correlative Right. What it is our duty to do, we must do because it is *right*, not because any one can demand it of us. We may, however, speak of those who are particularly benefited by the discharge of our duties as having a *Moral Claim* upon us. A distressed man has a *Moral Claim* to be relieved, in cases in which it is our Duty to relieve him.

"The distinctions just explained are sometimes expressed by using the terms *Perfect Obligation* and *Imperfect Obligation* for *Obligation* and *Duty* respectively; and the terms *Perfect Right* and *Imperfect Right*,* for *Right* and *Moral Claim* respectively. But these phrases have the inconvenience of making it seem as if our duties arose from the Rights of others; and as if duties were only legal Obligations, with an inferior degree of binding force."

There is the same difference between *ought* and *obliged*, that there is between *Duty* and *Obligation*. "I *ought* to do my duty, I am *obliged* to give a man his right."

Correlative Terms.

Scheme to
illustrate the
above

1. Obligation	... A Right.
2. Duty	... Moral claim.
Otherwise—	
1. Perfect obligation	... Perfect right.
2. Imperfect obligation	... Imperfect right.

* A *perfect right* is one which may be asserted by force, or in civil society by law.

An *imperfect right* is one which may not be thus enforced.

Examples of *perfect rights*.—A man's right to his life, person, house; for if these be attacked, he may repel the attack by instant violence, or punish the aggressor by law: a man's right to his estate, furniture, clothes, money, and to all ordinary articles of property; for, if they be injuriously taken from him, he may compel the author of the injury to make re-titution or satisfaction.

Examples of *imperfect rights*.—A poor neighbour has a right to relief; yet if it be refused him, he cannot extort it. A benefactor has a right to returns of gratitude from the person he has obliged; yet, if he meet with none, he must acquiesce. Children have a right to affection and education from their parents; and parents, on their part, to duty and reverence from their children. Yet if these rights be on either side withheld, there is no compulsion by which they can be enforced.—(Paley.)

<i>Moral.</i>	<i>Legal.</i>
'Right' (adjective) is wider than Duty	A Right.
Ought	Obligation.
"	Obliged.

D.

PALEY'S CLASSIFICATION OF DUTIES.

A man is said to be *obliged* "when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of another" (either man or God).

DUTIES.

Paley divides *duties* into the three following classes:

- I.—Those which a man owes to his neighbour, (*relative.*)
- II.—Those which he owes to himself.
- III.—Those which he owes to God.

I. *Relative Duties.*—These are sub-divided into—

- (a.) *Determinate*, such as promises, contracts, oaths.
- (b.) *Indeterminate*, such as charity, gratitude, &c.
- (c.) Those which result from the *constitution of the sexes*: such as the duties of husband and wife, the duty of parents, the duty of children, &c.

II. *Duties which a man owes to himself.*—A man's duty to himself consists in the care of his faculties and the preservation of his person, and the guarding against those practices which tend to injure the one or the other.

III. *Duties to God*; as for example, worship and reverence.

Promises.

Promises.—The obligation to keep a promise, according to the principle of expediency, arises from the circumstance that "confidence in promises, is essential to the intercourse of human life;" and the sense in which a promise is to be interpreted is that "in which the promiser apprehended, at the time, that the promisee received it."

Contracts.

Contracts.—These are mutual promises, and therefore governed by the same principles; consequently, "whatever is expected by one side, and known to be so expected by the other, is to be deemed a part or condition of the contract."

Oaths.

Oaths are to be "interpreted and performed in the sense in which the imposer intends them."

E.

1. WHEWELL ON OFFICES OF CONSCIENCE.

The word *conscious* implies a reflex attention of the mind ^{What is Conscience?} to its own condition or operation; a contemplation of what we ourselves feel and do. We *feel* pain, but we are *conscious* of impatience. Our consciousness reveals to us, not only our most secret acts, but our desires, affections, and intentions. These are the especial objects of morality, and we cannot think of them, without considering them as right or wrong. We approve, or disapprove, of what we have done, or tried to do. We consider our acts, external and internal, with reference to a moral standard of right and wrong. We recognise them as virtuous or vicious. The Faculty or Habit of doing this is Conscience.

As *Science* means *Knowledge*, *Conscience* etymologically means *Self-knowledge*; and such is the meaning of the word in Latin and French, and of the corresponding word in Greek; (*conscientia, conscience, synecidesis*). But the English word implies a Moral Standard of action in the mind, as well as a Consciousness of our own actions. It may be convenient to mark this distinction of an internal Moral Standard as one part of Conscience: and Self-knowledge, or Consciousness, as another part. The one is the Internal Law; the other the Internal Accuser, Witness, and Judge.

This distinction was noted by early Christian moralists. They termed the former part of Conscience, *Synteresis*, the internal Repository; the latter, *Syneidesis*, the internal Knowledge. We may term the former, Conscience as Law; the latter, Conscience as Witness.

Conscience as Law, is established by such a culture of our ^{Conscience} Reason as enables us to frame or to accept Rules which are ^{the Law.} in agreement with the Supreme Law; and by the agreement of our Moral Sentiments with such Rules.

The offices of Conscience as *Witness*, *Accuser*, and *Judge*, ^{Conscience, the Witness, &c.} cannot easily be separated; for to be conscious of having done an act, to question its character, and to know that it is wrong, are steps which usually follow close upon each other. Yet these steps may often be distinct. The moralists who distinguish the *Synteresis* from the *Syneidesis*, represent the

acts of Conscience as expressed by the three members of a Syllogism ; of which the first contains the *Law*, the second, the *Witness*, the third, the *Judgment*. As an example, we may take this Syllogism :

He who dissembles, transgresses the Duty of Truth.

I have dissembled ; Therefore I have transgressed the Duty of Truth.

Conscience,
the Punisher.

We may also note a further office ascribed to Conscience. Conscience inflicts *punishment* for the offences it condemns. For Self-accusation and Self-condemnation bring with them their especial pains. Repentance is sorrow ; Remorse is a pang, a torment. Transgression lies like a weight on the Conscience, and makes it feel burdened and oppressed.

SCHEME to
illustrate the
above.

1. Conscience as Law, (*Synteresis.*) This is the internal Moral Standard.
2. Conscience as Witness, (*Syneidesis.*) It acts as internal Accuser, Witness, and Judge.
3. Conscience as Punisher.

[WIEWELL, Rev. WILLIAM, D. D., (b. 1794—d. 1866), was Master of Trinity College, and Professor of Moral Philosophy, in the University of Cambridge. His principal Philosophical Works are: 'A History of the Inductive Sciences ;' 'The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences ;' 'The Elements of Morality ;' 'Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England.']

2. BUTLER ON AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE.

Butler has shown that the alleged strength of our passions is no real reason for yielding to them ; there being within us a higher principle, namely conscience, whose *authority* outweighs their strength. (*Vide* p. 101—3. Plato's view.)

He considers the nature of man as consisting partly of various appetites, passions, affections, and partly of the principle of reflection or conscience. Leaving out all consideration of the relative strength of these elements, it is shown that conscience has a natural superiority over the passions and appetites.

are but the shadows of those archetypal essences which exist in heaven, and which were revealed to the soul before it became imprisoned in the body.]

F.

OPINIONS OF THE ANCIENTS CONCERNING THE SUMMUM BONUM OR SOVEREIGN GOOD.—

This Diss. is
chiefly taken
from Stew-
art's Outlines
of Mor. Phil.

These opinions may be all reduced to three; those of the Epicureans, of the Stoics, and of the Peripatetics.

1st.—According to Epicurus, bodily pleasure and pain are the sole ultimate objects of desire and aversion; and everything else is desired or shunned, from its supposed tendency to procure the former, or to save us from the latter. Even the virtues are not valuable on their own account, but as the means of subjecting our pleasures and pains to our own power.

The pleasures and pains of the mind are all derived (in the system of this philosopher) from the recollection and anticipation of those of the body; but these recollections and anticipations are represented as of more value to our happiness, on the whole, than the pleasures and pains from which they are derived; for they occupy a much greater proportion of life, and the regulation of them depends on ourselves. Epicurus, therefore, placed the Supreme Good in ease of body and tranquillity of mind, but much more in the latter than in the former; insomuch that he affirmed that a wise man might preserve his happiness under any degree of bodily suffering.

2nd.—The Stoics placed the Supreme Good in rectitude of conduct, without any regard to the event.

Virtue, they said, is the only absolute good: Vice, is the only positive evil: everything else is morally indifferent, possessing only a relative value, which renders it in a greater or less degree capable of becoming an object of choice, of avoidance, or simply of toleration.

3rd.—The Peripatetics also admitted that virtue ought to be the law of our conduct, and that no other good was to be compared to it; but they did not represent it as the *sole* good, nor affect a total indifference to things external. Aristotle regarded *happiness* as the highest end of all human action. He made happiness consist in the *active development of virtue*, such development being secured by *favorable external conditions*.

For his account of virtue, v. p. 42.

Epicureans.—Their school was founded by Epicurus.

Epicureans.

EPICURUS was born, b. c. 342, in Samos. In the thirty-second year of his age he opened a school at Mytilene. Not satisfied, however, with the narrow sphere there afforded him, he repaired to Athens, purchased a pleasant garden, where he took up his residence, and taught his philosophy; and hence his disciples were called *the philosophers of the garden*. He spent the remainder of his life at Athens, surrounded by numerous friends and pupils. His mode of living was simple, temperate, and cheerful. He died in 270, after a long and painful illness, which he endured with patience and courage.

Life of Epicurus.

Stoics.—Their school was founded by Zeno.

Stoics.

ZENO was a native of Cyprus. He taught at Athens, about b. c. 200. His school was established in the Stoa or Porch, which was adorned with fresco paintings of the battle of Marathon. From this Stoa the school derived its name. The Stoic philosophy was much cultivated at Rome. Seneca, Epictetus, and the illustrious M. Aurelius Antoninus were the brightest ornaments of Roman Stoicism.

Life of Zeno.

Peripatetics.—Their school was founded by Aristotle.

Peripatetics.

ARISTOTLE was born at Stageira, b. c. 384. He pursued his studies at Athens, where he was a pupil of Plato. In b. c. 335, he set up a school of his own in the Lyceum at Athens. Here he drew together a large number of distinguished scholars, to whom he delivered lectures on philosophy in the shady walks (*peripati*.) which surrounded the Lyceum; hence the name *peripatetic*, which has been applied to his school. Being accused of impiety, he withdrew from Athens, and died very shortly after at Chalcis in Eubœa, b. c. 322.

Life of Aristotle.

G.

THE GENERAL DEFINITION OF VIRTUE.

Duties all agree with each other in one common quality, that of being *obligatory* on rational and voluntary agents; and they are all enjoined by the same authority;—the authority of conscience. Our various Duties, therefore, are but different articles of one law, which is properly expressed by the word virtue.

The same word is employed to express the moral excellency of a character. When so employed, it seems properly to denote a confirmed *habit* of mind, as distinguished from good dispositions operating occasionally. The characters of men receive their denominations of Covetous, Voluptuous, Ambitious, &c., from the particular active principle which prevailingly influences the conduct. A man, accordingly, whose ruling or habitual principle of action is a sense of Duty, or a regard to what is Right, may be properly denominated Virtuous.—*(Stewart.)*

H.

OF AN AMBIGUITY IN THE WORDS RIGHT AND
WRONG, VIRTUE AND VICE.

The epithets Right and Wrong, Virtuous and Vicious, are applied sometimes to external acts, and sometimes to the intentions of the agent.

The distinction made by some moralists between Absolute and Relative Rectitude, was introduced, in order to obviate the confusion of ideas which this ambiguity has a tendency to produce.

An action may be said to be *Absolutely right*, when it is in every respect suitable to the circumstances in which the agent is placed.

An action may be said to be *Relatively right*, when the intentions of the agent are *sincerely good*; whether his conduct be suitable to his circumstances or not.

faculty. Self-love, or a prudential regard to our own happiness, is not inconsistent with virtue. The moral obligation to do right is based upon the authority of conscience, the supreme moral faculty.

The various branches of our duty, which result from our active powers, are the following :

1. Our duty to our Creator. This involves three great principles, namely, the existence of a Deity, His moral attributes, and the immortality of the soul.

2. The duties we owe to our fellow-men, *viz.*, Benevolence, Justice, and Veracity ; the last including Candour and Uprightness of Character.

3. The duties we owe to ourselves, such as Prudence, Temperance, and Fortitude.

The system of Stewart is nearly identical with that of Reid ; both Reid and Stewart systematically worked out the scheme of human nature suggested by Butler.]

QUESTIONS

On Abercrombie's "Philosophy of the Moral Feelings."

1. Characterise man (1) intellectually, and (2) morally.
2. What is essential to a well-regulated mental constitution?
3. Discuss the importance of moral science.
4. What peculiar means of information have we in moral science?
5. Trace the analogy between intellectual and moral First Truths.
6. Classify and examine the moral First Truths.
7. Show that First Truths are not due to Revelation, nor to Logical Processes.
8. What evidence is there for the uniformity of moral distinctions?
Show the importance of recognising certain fundamental principles of rectitude in ourselves and others.
9. What elements enter into the constitution of man as a moral being?
Among these elements which are to be regarded as *primary* principles of action?
10. Enumerate the active principles: why are they termed *active*?
11. What are the passive emotions? Examine their mode of operation.

PART I.

12. Define *desire*; and classify the *desires*.
13. Define and characterise the Appetites. How do the Appetites differ from the other Desires?
14. Describe Avarice.
15. Distinguish between the Desire of Power and the Desire of Superiority. Show how each of them operates as a motive principle.
16. Characterise the Desire of Esteem.
17. Distinguish between Pride and Vanity.
18. Characterise the Desire of Knowledge.
19. Examine the Desire of Moral Improvement, and describe the mental condition which springs from it.
20. Define the limits within which the several desires should be gratified, in order to produce a sound moral condition.
21. Select any two of the desires, and show in what respects their tendencies are beneficial, or the contrary.
22. Define an Affection.
23. Distinguish between Desires and Affections.
24. How do the Affections operate, and what important purpose do they serve?
25. Classify the Affections.
26. On what grounds is Justice included among the Affections?
27. What are the three classes of rights which form the basis of natural jurisprudence? Of what nature are those principles of justice which vary in different countries?

28. In what does the sense of justice consist ?

29. What are the moral obligations that flow from a sense of justice ?

30. In what does Integrity or Honesty consist ?
When the interests of others are affected, what should be the *rule*, and what the *test* of our conduct ?

31. Whence arises the Right of Personal Liberty, and to what restrictions is it liable ?

32. How is a due regard for the reputation of others to be secured ?

33. Under what circumstances might a person (A.) be required to make a statement prejudicial to another (B.) ?
By what rules should A. guide his conduct in such cases ?

34. What constitutes Candour, and to what is it opposed ?

35. State how injury may be done to the moral principles of others.

36. What two objects are promoted by the due exercise of Compassion and Benevolence ?

37. Does *merit* necessarily belong to the exercise of the benevolent affections ? Give reasons for your answer.

38. Under what heads does Abercrombie treat of the benevolent affections ?

39. How does Justice differ from Benevolence ?

40. How is Benevolence to be exercised towards the reputation of others ?

41. Benevolence towards the feelings of others—What does this include?

42. How does a confidence in the veracity of mankind affect all social dealings?

43. What are the essentials of Veracity?

44. Distinguish between Scepticism and Credulity?

45. What constitutes *accuracy in the statement of facts*?

Characterise Direct Fallacy.

Show that a statement, literally true, may yet be related in such a way as to convey an erroneous impression.

46. Define Sincerity, and contrast it with its opposite. Give examples in illustration.

47. Characterise Hypocrisy and Flattery. Distinguish between Simulation and Dissimulation.

48. Friendship, Love, Gratitude—in what do these three affections consist?

49. Define Patriotism, and indicate its sources.

50. Enumerate the Domestic Affections.

51. What are the Defensive Affections, and what is their proper object? What objection may be urged against the classification of Affections as *benevolent* and *malevolent*?

52. Is punishment in the case of public offenders, retributive or preventive, or both? What precautions are necessary in carrying out such punishments?

53. When are the Defensive Affections exercised in an unwarranted manner?

54. Discuss the influence produced upon the exercise of the Affections by Attention.

55. Analyse Sympathy, and examine its use.

56. "The principle of Self-love brought into action by Sympathy, should be the test, not the rule of our conduct." Explain this, and state upon what the rule of conduct rests.

57. Familiarity with distress lessens our sympathy at beholding it, and so tends to produce in us an indifference about relieving it. How is the consequent tendency to moral deterioration to be counteracted?

58. What influence should Habit exercise upon the Affections?

59. How does Moral Approbation operate upon the Affections?

60. What part of our physical system is analogous to the emotive part of our moral system? Illustrate your answer.

61. Show that there is a compensating power among the affections by which they act as checks on each other.

62. Expatiate on the happiness which accrues to the individual from a due regulation of the Affections and Desires.

63. Define Self-love.

Distinguish between Prudence and Selfishness.

64. How does Self-love differ from Selfishness? What is the tendency of a rational Self-love?

65. What is the proper office of Self-love viewed as a principle of moral action?

66. Examine the gratification derived from a sound and rational Self-love.

67. How is the principle of Self-love distinct from Conscience, and what practical importance does the distinction involve?

68. "A certain balance between Self-love and the Affections is essential to a sound moral condition." Enlarge upon this remark, and show how the balance, when destroyed, may be restored.

69. Examine and illustrate the effects of Self-love when deranged in its exercise and objects.

PART II.

70. Define Will.

71. Analyse and explain the mental process which terminates in volition.

72. What are the *moving powers* in our nature?

73. What are *motives*? Enumerate and characterise the principal motives.

74. What circumstances are required for the uniform operation of motives on the will?

Illustrate fully the uniform relation between motives and actions.

75. Does Self-love belong to the *moving* or *determining* principles of man's nature? Give reasons for your answer.

76. Explain the fact that men's wills are differently influenced, although the same motives are before them.

77. What are the three characters described by Abercrombie in order to illustrate the influence of moral causes upon human conduct? Show how far the actions of the individuals in each case may be relied upon.

78. What *knowledge* is required for the due regulation of the Will?

79. Indicate the sources from which a knowledge of God's attributes is derived.

80. Discuss the influence of Attention upon the Will.

81. Fully analyse the mental process which must precede *right* action.

82. State the result as regards action :

(i.) When the inclinations are not regulated by moral causes.

(ii.) When the moral causes are allowed to prevent wrong action, but the inclination is still cherished.

(iii.) When wrong action is prevented, not by conscience, but by certain inferior motives, the inclination as before being cherished in opposition to conscience.

83. What is Passion?

84. In what cases may Moral Harmony be destroyed without any wrong action being committed?

85. Define a Moral Habit.

86. Why are good habits morally praiseworthy, and in what does the guilt of bad habits consist?

87. How may injurious moral habits be best corrected?

PART III.

88. What is the Moral Principle, and what evidence is there of its existence?

89. Define the province of Conscience, and explain how Conscience acts.

90. Trace the analogy between Conscience and Reason.

91. Contrast the feelings which always accompany our moral judgments with those which are derived from a mere process of reasoning.

92. Investigate the effect produced upon the Desires, the Affections, and the Conduct respectively when the controlling influence of Conscience is suspended or lost.

Does moral derangement necessarily impair the judgment?

93. How do we infer—

“(a.) That God is One Being, Infinite, Self-existent, and Eternal?

(b.) That He is endowed with Wisdom and Benevolence?

(c.) That He possesses Moral Attributes?

94. State briefly the considerations that present themselves when man is viewed in relation to God.

95. Characterise the process by which, in individual instances, Conscience ceases to be the regulating principle of the character.

96. From the truths conveyed to our minds respecting the Deity, certain emotions naturally arise, of which He is the object. Specify the truths and the corresponding emotions.

97. Investigate the conditions necessary for securing the moral harmony of the mind.

98. Trace the mental process which must be gone through in order that moral truths may produce their due influence on the character and conduct. Point out what part of this process is voluntary: when this part is neglected, what is the result?

99. Classify Duties.

100. Discuss the influence produced on our moral judgments by Attention.

101. How far is man responsible for his Belief?

102. Explain and illustrate the important relation existing between our moral emotions and certain voluntary mental processes.

103. What is the fact for which *dependent* Moral Theories seek to account, and in what do they all agree?

104. What is involved in the simple idea of virtue or vice, as applied, (i.) to the act, and (ii.) to the agent?

105. What two rival hypotheses have been adopted to account for the origin and nature of moral distinctions?

106. What is the Theory of Mandeville, and to what objections is it open?

107. Explain the Mutual Compact Theory.

108. State and criticise the Ethical Theories of Hume and Hobbes.

109. What modification of the Utilitarian Theory did Paley introduce, and what are the peculiar characteristics of his system?

110. How does Abercrombie criticise Paley's ethical system?

111. State the principal objections that may be urged against the doctrine of Utility.

112. What moral facts may be adduced to show that the decisions of conscience are independent of any reasoning process?

113. What is meant by the immutability of moral distinctions?

114. Should the Moral Law be deduced from the *nature* or from the *will* of God?

Justify your answer.

115. How may it be shown that such eccentricities of practice, as the encouragement of theft in Sparta, and infanticide in India, prove no diversity of moral feeling?

116. The abnormal practices of certain nations have been adduced to overthrow the belief in a uniformity of moral feeling. Give instances of such practices, and refute the arguments founded on them.

117. Describe the Ethical Theory of Adam Smith, and point out its defects.

118. Examine the function of *reason* in judging of the tendencies of actions according as they do or do not involve a feeling of moral duty.

119. What should be the *standard*, and what the *test* of moral rectitude?

120. Point out the leading relations that man sustains to God and to his fellow-men respectively. How must these relations be adjusted to secure a proper condition of the moral feelings?

121. Is the harmony of the moral feelings consistent with an exclusive devotion to the affairs of the present life, or with an exclusive devotion to religion?

Give reasons for your answer.

PART IV.

122. Examine what should be the condition of the heart and mind when man is regarded as under the immediate inspection of the Deity.

123. Analyse Faith.

What is necessary for the sound exercise of Faith?

124. Faith is a mean between two mental imperfections. Explain these imperfections, and show that they both have a kindred origin.

125. What are the truths which it is the immediate object of Faith to bring before us?

MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS.*

1. How do Mental and Moral Science differ? What is the object of Moral Science? Into what two parts is it divided?

* Many of these are taken from the Calcutta University Calendars. The same question has been sometimes inserted more than once under different forms;—this has been done purposely, as students are often puzzled when questions are stated in terms with which they are not familiar.

2. Show that there are certain articles of belief which arise as primary principles with an immediate feeling of conviction in our moral constitution.
3. State the effects of each of the Desires.
4. Show that the Appetites are not selfish.
5. Why do we value disinterested conduct in the exercise of the Affections?
6. What is the difference between the rule and the ultimate ground of moral rectitude? What is the true ultimate ground?
7. Among which of our active powers would you place the *passions*?
8. In what does Attention consist? What aid may it derive from the Imagination? What influence has it in moral decisions?
9. What effect ought a consideration of the moral relation which exists between man and the Deity to have on our moral feelings?
10. What subjects principally are treated of in Moral Philosophy?
11. Give a list of the active and moral principles, classifying them as those which govern, and those which require to be governed.
12. What is meant by the Selfish System? What objections may be urged against it?
13. What is meant by Utilitarianism?
14. What is meant by Right, and what by Obligation? What relation have they to each other?
15. State the chief grounds on which human free agency has been denied.
16. Distinguish between Corrective and Distributive Justice.

17. Define Self-love as a rule of action. How far can it possess a moral value?

18. A person refrains from committing an act which he knows to be wrong, because its discovery would bring disgrace on him. Another person refrains from the same act, because, though it would bring present gratification, the recollection of it would be painful.

What is the guiding principle in each case?

19. State some of the chief impressions calculated to act as moral causes, in determining the volition.

20. Prove the existence of conscience in all men.

21. Whence arises moral obligation, from the nature of virtue? from the will of God? or from both? Give reasons for your opinion.

22. Among the theories of morals, which of the systems referred to by Abercrombie, do you consider the best? which, the worst? in what does he consider the best of them defective?

23. Distinguish between Desire and Will. What relation do they bear to each other, to the Feelings, and to the Intellectual Powers?

24. Give a brief account of the principal theories of morals, classifying them under the two heads of "Disinterested" and "Selfish;" or according as they affirm or deny the reality of moral distinctions.

25. By what means can we influence our Feelings?

If, for example, it were our wish to call up within us the feeling of compassion for any one in distress, what steps could we adopt to accomplish that object?

26. State *briefly* what you consider the due regulation of the moral feelings to consist in, and mention any circumstances that might lead to their derangement.

27. "He who grieves at his own abstinence, is a voluptuary." Explain fully the import of this assertion.

28. Distinguish the Utilitarian Theory of Morals from the Selfish Theory.

29. Contrast the Feelings which are always conjoined with our *moral* judgments with those which accompany any merely *scientific* judgment, or any judgment which is derived from a mere process of reasoning.

30. Show how the desire of Approbation, when properly regulated, is calculated to produce a highly beneficial influence, and state some of the evils resulting from a perverted use of this feeling.

31. Contrast the control or voluntary power which we can exercise over any of our *intellectual* processes with that which we can exercise over our *feelings*.

32. State and examine Paley's definition of Virtue.

33. "Conscience is like a British Judge, who does not make, but only declares, the law."—*Sterne*. Examine this view.

34. By whom, and in what way, was the term 'Moral Sense' first introduced?

35. Explain the terms 'Dependent' and 'Independent' as employed to characterise ethical systems.

Distribute the following moralists according to that division: Plato, Hobbes, Butler, Paley, Hume, Clarke.

36. Name, as many as you are able, of the leading writers on Ethics, with any leading peculiarities of their respective systems.

37. State the principal reasons in favor of the moral duty of truth.

38. Explain *perfect* and *imperfect* rights.

39. Illustrate the uniformity of sequence of motives and actions in the human will.

40. Specify the particular duties coming under the head of justice.

41. Enumerate and define the four *cardinal* virtues.

